

29 MAY 1947

I N D E X  
of  
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
1155	2672		Affidavit of YANO, Masao		23271
1154	2673		Affidavit of MATSUMURA, Tomokatsu		23212
1149	2674		Affidavit of FUTAMI, Akishuro		23287
1145	2675		Affidavit of TANABE, Moritake (except 3rd paragraph)		23291
1323	2676		Affidavit of TANAKA, Shinichi		23303

1 Thursday, 29 May 1947

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3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, same as before.

14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

15 For the Defense Section, same as before.

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17 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
18 to English interpretation was made by the  
19 Language Section, IMTPE.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

4 - - -

5 Y U K I O K A S A H A R A, recalled as a witness  
6 on behalf of the defense, resumed the stand  
7 and testified through Japanese interpreters  
8 as follows:

9 CROSS-EXAMINATION

10 BY COLONEL IVANOV (Continued):

11 Q Mr. Witness, didn't you plan in your docu-  
12 ment that in case your first proposal to be ready for  
13 the war against the USSR at any moment wouldn't be  
14 accepted that a second proposal should be accepted?

15 A That was my idea while I was in Moscow.

16 Q Didn't your second proposal provide for the  
17 program of the armament of the army to be completed  
18 in ten years, that is by 1941, and thus the army  
19 should apparently be prepared for a war against the  
20 USSR on the basis of the strategy of annihilation of  
21 the Soviet Union?

22 A No, that is no so.

23 COLONEL IVANOV: May the witness be shown  
24 exhibit 2671.

25 Q I shall read to you an excerpt from paragraph 5

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22 A No, that is no so.

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24 exhibit 2671.

25 Q I shall read to you an excerpt from paragraph 5



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1 of the second part of the document. I quote, page 4  
2 of the English text, paragraph 2. Follow my reading.

3 "The objects of this consolidation are twofold:

4 "1. Consolidation so that whenever war  
5 strikes, everything is ready.

6 "2. Consolidation so that even if there are  
7 a few difficulties to begin with, everything is per-  
8 fect after ten years.

9 "It is a very important problem which  
10 principle we depend on. If the authorities decide  
11 on a policy of beginning the war against Russia as  
12 soon as possible according to the first-mentioned  
13 principle we, of course, will depend on the former.  
14 In the event, however, of our being unable to con-  
15 jecture the time of the war, it would be better to  
16 choose rather the latter. This is why Russia will  
17 not be able to carry out military operations on a  
18 large scale against foreign countries according to  
19 the first-mentioned principle, even if the war with  
20 Russia breaks out now or the near future. It is  
21 of course necessary to undertake at once everything  
22 that will involve expenditure, such as holding  
23 manoeuvres, urgent and indispensable items such as  
24 the training of troops."  
25

Such proposals were made by you to the

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1 General Staff, weren't they?

2 A Yes, I did propose so, but as I said just  
3 a moment ago I did not propose that an offensive  
4 war be conducted against the Soviet Union ten years  
5 hence, as the prosecutor has said. On the contrary,  
6 I said that unless war was waged immediately --

7 THE MONITOR: At that time I said that it  
8 would be more favorable to us if we opened a war  
9 immediately. However, if we waited the Soviet  
10 strength would increase to phenomenal size and that  
11 they would, the Soviet Union would start the aggression  
12 from their side. Therefore, the second proposal had  
13 as its purport to prepare defenses against an aggres-  
14 sion by the Soviet side.

15 Q Mr. Witness, your document speaks for it-  
16 self. I don't want to change anything in your  
17 document, and will you answer my questions exactly.

18 Mr. Witness, will you tell us, after you  
19 submitted your document in which the purposes and  
20 strategic principles of a war against the USSR were  
21 dealt with, weren't you transferred for further  
22 service to the Japanese General Staff as the head of  
23 the Russian Section of the Second Division?

24 A Yes, I was transferred and became the head  
25 of the Russian Branch.

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1 Q It was at the beginning of 1932, wasn't it?

2 A I was transferred to my new duties in April  
3 of 1932.

4 Q Tell us, Mr. Witness, did not the Japanese  
5 General Staff in 1932 take a decision to complete  
6 preparations for a war against the USSR by the  
7 beginning of 1934?

8 A The General Staff did not make such a  
9 decision -- does not make such a decision.

10 Q I shall read to you an excerpt from our  
11 message which you, being head of the Russian Section  
12 of the Second Division of the General Staff, handed  
13 to KAWABE, Military Attache in Moscow in summer of  
14 1932. I quote exhibit 702, page 1, paragraph 1:

15 "It was decided that the (army and navy's)  
16 preparations for waging war against Russia should  
17 be completed before the middle of 1934. However,  
18 it does not mean that hostilities will be opened  
19 immediately after the preparations have been com-  
20 pleted. In order to consolidate Manchuria, the war  
21 against Russia is necessary for Japan."  
22

23 Did you tell it?

24 A At that time I informed Lieutenant Colonel  
25 KANDA something similar to what was just read, but  
not exactly the same. As I have stated in my affidavit,

1 there was an agreement among the section chiefs and  
2 the branch chiefs that preparations would be made  
3 for a war by 1934, but this did not mean that these  
4 plans had as its object a war of aggression against  
5 the Soviet Union. Moreover, this agreement reached  
6 among the section chiefs and branch chiefs for the  
7 completion of military preparations was later, when  
8 viewed concretely -- the conclusion was reached  
9 that it was impossible to put such plans into effect,  
10 and these plans were therefore abandoned.

11 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, I refer the  
12 Members of the Tribunal to exhibit 702 in order to  
13 test the credibility of the witness.

14 Q Mr. Witness, do you in your affidavit  
15 instead of 1932 give wrong date on which allegedly  
16 the decision on the completion of preparations for a  
17 war against the USSR was taken by General Staff of  
18 Japan in 1933?

19 A That is a mistake on my part. I wrote it  
20 wrong.

21 Q Mr. Witness, will you tell me were there in  
22 the General Staff such rules that the heads of divisions  
23 could undertake, independently of the Chief of the  
24 General Staff, to settle the questions connected with  
25 the dates of war against other states?

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22 the General Staff such rules that the heads of divisions  
23 could undertake, independently of the Chief of the  
24 General Staff, to settle the questions connected with  
25 the dates of war against other states?



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1           A    No, they could not make such a decision,  
2           and therefore no such decisions were made.

3           Q    But in the document itself it was said that  
4           it was decided to complete preparations for a war  
5           against the USSR. The word "decide" was mentioned  
6           in the document. Therefore, such decision was taken,  
7           was it not?

8           A    Where did I write that a decision would be  
9           made to carry out a war?

10          THE MONITOR: Where did I write that  
11          decision was made, where in my document?

12          Q    Such decisions are rarely given in a written  
13          form. You spoke about this decision orally to  
14          Lieutenant Colonel KANDA, Military Attache in Moscow,  
15          didn't you?

16          A    Verbal messages to that effect -- I did  
17          give such a verbal message to Lieutenant Colonel  
18          KANDA, but the facts were different. I can say  
19          definitely this was so because I know that the  
20          facts differ.

21          THE MONITOR: Slight correction: I did  
22          give verbal message to Lieutenant Colonel KANDA.  
23          However, the contents of that message are not as  
24          you, Mr. Prosecutor, has stated. The fact belies  
25          this, because I know the facts. I know that that



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1 was not the message.

2 A (Continuing) I believe that a verbal  
3 agreement of a nature had been reached. I believe  
4 I said that a verbal agreement was reached.

5 COLONEL IVANOV: There is only one way to  
6 test the credibility of your testimony now; that is  
7 the document itself. May the witness be shown  
8 exhibit 702, Japanese photo copy of the original  
9 text.

10 Q Mr. Witness, you have photo copy of  
11 exhibit 702. This is a record of a message given  
12 by Lieutenant Colonel KANDA, Military Attache in  
13 Moscow, in your name. I shall read now the text of  
14 the document. You follow my reading, whether I read  
15 correctly the contents of the document. You there  
16 said. I quote:

17 "It was decided that the (army and navy's)  
18 preparations for waging war against Russia should  
19 be completed before the middle of 1934. However,  
20 it does not mean that hostilities will be opened  
21 immediately after the preparations have been  
22 completed. In order to consolidate Manchuria, the  
23 war against Russia is necessary for Japan."  
24

25 That was written in 1932; that is, fifteen  
years ago. Didn't this document refresh your memory,

1 Mr. Witness? Your message contained these words,  
2 the message which you gave to Lieutenant Colonel  
3 KANDA? Was it not so?

4 A I do not recall what I had said fifteen  
5 years ago. However, when this exhibit was shown  
6 to me before I recalled that something similar in  
7 nature, and therefore I recalled in part what  
8 had occurred at that time. Therefore, I do not  
9 remember word for word what I had said at that  
10 time, but I do know that the facts differ.

11 THE MONITOR: I do know that the facts  
12 differ from the transmitted message. Therefore,  
13 I know that the message could not have been as you  
14 say because the facts at the time differ from it.  
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1           Q   If I believe that an agreement, tenta-  
2           tive agreement, among the section chiefs had been  
3           misunderstood and misinterpreted as being a deci-  
4           sion -- Mr. Witness, in documents exhibits 696,  
5           702, and 2671 you, in 1931-32, frankly wrote about  
6           favorable conditions for a war -- about aggressive  
7           purposes of a war against the U.S.S.R, and in  
8           your affidavit you write that allegedly the  
9           General Staff of Japan at that time was afraid  
10          of the Soviet armed intervention in the Manchurian  
11          question. How can we reconcile this contradiction  
12          between these documents written at the time and  
13          your impressions of the events?

14          A   Then I wrote that the time was opportune  
15          for a war against Russia, it was in 1935, when I  
16          was in Russia. But upon my return to Japan and  
17          viewing the internal situation in Japan and the  
18          fact that the status of armaments in Japan was far  
19          less than I had expected, I realized that what I  
20          had wrote at that time while I was in Russia was  
21          a mistake.

22                THE MONITOR: 1935 is corrected to 1931.

23          Q   Was it not from Japan that in July, 1932,  
24          you sent your message about the decision taken  
25          to complete the preparations for a war against the

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CROSS

1 U.S.S.R. by the beginning of 1934 -- wasn't it from  
2 Tokyo? You again contradict the facts.

3 A There is no inconsistency in what I have  
4 said.

5 THE MONITOR: What I said was that I sent  
6 a message something like the message you read but  
7 not the message you quoted. I said that wasn't the  
8 message I sent. Therefore, there is no inconsistency  
9 at all in my testimony. Furthermore, the war against  
10 the Soviet Union which is written down here does  
11 not mean that it was an aggressive war, an offen-  
12 sive war against the Soviet Union -- not a war  
13 initiated by the Japanese side. War preparations  
14 means preparations for a war which might occur at  
15 any time. It does not mean preparations for an  
16 offensive war.

17 Q If by the defensive war against the Soviet  
18 Union, of which you speak now, you mean the objec-  
19 tives set forth in your document, that is, to make  
20 the Soviet territory at least as far as Lake  
21 Bakalie part of Imperial territory, then we really  
22 can understand your answers.

23 Mr. Witness, now I shall pass on to one  
24 more theme of your report, exhibit 2671.

25 Mr. Witness, didn't you propose to use

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CROSS

1 more extensive subversive activities against the  
2 U.S.S.R. for the purpose of dealing the U.S.S.R.  
3 a crushing blow?

4 A Yes, I did propose so. Before that I  
5 would like to add to my reply to the previous ques-  
6 tion.

7 Previous to that the prosecutor mentioned  
8 that the occupation of Lake Bakalie would be an  
9 aggressive war -- of Trans-Bakalie would be an act  
10 of aggression; but as I said before, when I returned  
11 to Japan, in 1931, the General Staff did not accept  
12 my plans. In fact, they ridiculed the plans and  
13 they were not adopted. Again, the occupation of  
14 the Trans-Bakalie provinces means that this would  
15 be done after a war had broken out. It does not  
16 mean an act of aggression or an aggressive war.  
17 Furthermore, when I advocated the occupation of the  
18 Trans-Bakalie provinces I had in mind that in the  
19 event of a long, protracted war these provinces  
20 should be regarded as a part of Japanese territory,  
21 for the purpose of gaining self-sufficiency to carry  
22 out such a protracted war.

23 Q Mr. Witness, will you answer my questions,  
24 briefly?

25 Didn't you also propose to concentrate



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1 the activities of the Japanese Intelligence Ser-  
2 vice on the carrying on of subversive activities  
3 against the U.S.S.R. chiefly?

4 A No, I did not make such a proposal. That  
5 I did say was that subversive actions must be taken,  
6 but not to make this the main duty of the Intelli-  
7 gence agencies of the army.

8 Q I shall read the last excerpt from the docu-  
9 ment. I will quote paragraph 3 of the second  
10 section of the document. That is page 3 of the  
11 English text.

12 "As stated above, if the circumstances  
13 make it difficult to extinguish the enemy altogether  
14 in the Far East, it is an especially important and  
15 essential requisite in the war against Russia to  
16 draw the countries adjacent to the Soviet Union  
17 into the war against Russia by strategical propa-  
18 ganda, and by utilizing anti-Soviet elements both  
19 inside and outside the Soviet, such as "White Russians"  
20 organizations and races of different kinds to bring  
21 about her internal collapse. We have shown above  
22 that conditions in Soviet Russia would have a bene-  
23 ficial influence in the execution of this strategi-  
24 cal propaganda. Therefore believe it will prove  
25 very valuable to consolidate our connections with



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1 the countries adjacent to Soviet Russia, diplomati-  
2 cally, militarily, and in every way possible, as  
3 well as to maintain our peace-time connections with  
4 anti-Soviet elements.

5 "Accordingly, our counter-intelligence  
6 corps should not be located solely for the purpose  
7 of collecting intelligence about the Soviet; its  
8 location should be decided upon with equal atten-  
9 tion to the strategic viewpoint."

10 Did you write about it?

11 A Yes, I did  
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1 Q Mr. Witness, didn't HIROTA, the then  
2 Japanese Ambassador to Moscow share your views  
3 on the attitude of Japan towards the USSR?

4 Correction: The accused HIROTA.

5 A I do not believe that his attitude was  
6 the same as mine. Ambassador HIROTA did not advocate  
7 a war. He stated that at the time there need be  
8 no fear in case a war did -- should break out, and  
9 that various problems such as the problem of fisheries  
10 between the two countries, negotiations be undertaken  
11 for their settlement.

12 THE MONITOR: HIROTA did not advocate war  
13 or favor war. What he said to me and he frequently  
14 told me was that since Russia was not to be feared  
15 at that time this was an opportune moment to settle  
16 all pending problems between the two countries such  
17 as fishing problems and that this can be settled  
18 by positive action from the Japanese side because  
19 of the absence of fear.

20 Q Did not HIROTA consider the seizure of the  
21 Soviet Far East and Siberia rather than defense  
22 against communism to be the main task of war with  
23 the USSR?

24 A He may have said that to Major General  
25 HARADA, but these were not Ambassador HIROTA's

1 formal ideas. As I said before, I feel that he had  
2 some other motive in mind in saying such a thing  
3 to Major General HARADA.

4 Q You arrived at this conclusion now after  
5 16 years, after 16 years have passed since the events.  
6 Now, let us see the document. I will remind you the  
7 message was sent by HIROTA and recorded by you  
8 personally. That is exhibit 693.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

10 MR. BLAKENEY: I didn't mean to interrupt  
11 before the question was finished. The last three  
12 questions, I submit, are wholly without the scope  
13 of the testimony in chief and I therefore object  
14 to any further questioning on this line.

15 COLONEL IVANOV: The witness in his affidavit  
16 took the liberty to state -- to deny the existence  
17 of the plans of aggressive war against the USSR,  
18 and that the government officials of Japan had no  
19 aggressive purpose in this war. I submit, that the  
20 Honorable Tribunal should fully estimate the credibility  
21 of his testimony. For this purpose precisely, I  
22 am going to read the following quotation.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

24 MR. BLAKENEY: The witness -- I, of course,  
25 didn't hear part of the statement -- but I heard

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1 the statement made that the witness took the liberty  
2 of testifying to the intentions of Japanese officials.  
3 That he did not do. The witness testified to some  
4 matters concerning the policy of the Japanese  
5 Government, but he is now being asked about the  
6 opinions of individuals.

7 THE PRESIDENT: I suppose HIROTA, the  
8 accused HIROTA, was a member of the Japanese Govern-  
9 ment at that time.

10 COLONEL IVANOV: That is quite correct,  
11 your Honor. He was first Foreign Minister and later  
12 Prime Minister of Japan.

13 THE PRESIDENT: But you are going to put  
14 to him something that the witness said to HIROTA,  
15 I understand. What was HIROTA then? Was he just  
16 a private citizen?

17 COLONEL IVANOV: HIROTA was then Ambassador  
18 to Moscow from Imperial Japan. At the sametime the  
19 witness KASAHARA was a military attache at the  
20 Japanese Embassy in Moscow in the USSR.

21 MR. BLAKENEY: The statement had already  
22 been made that HIROTA was at that time Ambassador,  
23 and, therefore, patently he was not a member of the  
24 Government.  
25

THE PRESIDENT: He would not be responsible

KASAHARA

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1 for the policy of the Government. I do not know  
2 that the witness set out to testify what was the  
3 attitude of such people as Ambassadors towards  
4 this question, but he did purport to state the  
5 attitude of the Government and that may, of course,  
6 be manifested in the Ambassador's statement.

7 I think the question is on the borderline  
8 and it should be allowed. The objection is overruled.  
9 BY COLONEL IVANOV (Continued):

10 Q I quote exhibit 693. That is a message  
11 by HIROTA, recorded by KASAHARA personally.

12 "Desire the following matters be especially  
13 transmitted to the Chief of General Staff.

14 "Aside from whether Japan will wage a war  
15 against Soviet Russia, it is necessary for Japan  
16 to have strong policies against Soviet Russia being  
17 ready for war at any time. Its principal purpose  
18 is not defense against Communism but rather the  
19 conquest of Eastern Siberia."

20 Did you record those words, Mr. Witness?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Do I understand you and HIROTA correctly,  
23 Mr. Witness, if I state that the northern problems --  
24 that the Far Eastern problems, as you call them,  
25 and the northern problems as they are called by

KASAHARA

CROSS

1 others, meant Soviet territory of the Far East  
2 which it was Japan's plan to seize; that is, the  
3 Soviet Far East and Siberia?

4 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

5 MR. BLAKENEY: I couldn't hear the English  
6 translation and I ask that it be repeated.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Will the court reporter  
8 repeat that.

9 (Whereupon, the last question  
10 was read by the official court reporter.)

11 THE SOVIET INTERPRETER: Addition: "and  
12 Zabaikalie.

13 A The settlement of Far Eastern problems  
14 did not mean the occupation of Soviet territory  
15 in the Far East. It means that the various clashes,  
16 problems, existing between the two countries in the  
17 Far East -- arising between the two countries in  
18 the Far East should be settled.  
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1 Q You again contradict yourself by your own  
2 testimony and by statements made by Mr. HIROTA.

3 Correction: you again contradict -- make contra-  
4 dictions between your statements and the statements  
5 made by Mr. HIROTA which were recorded in the docu-  
6 ments 16 years ago. I pass on to the next question.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel, do not address him  
8 that way. Just put questions to him.

9 COLONEL IVANOV: Yes, sir.

10 THE PRESIDENT: It is for us to decide whether  
11 he contradicts himself.

12 COLONEL IVANOV: May the witness be shown  
13 exhibit No. 779?

14 THE PRESIDENT: Before he looks at that I have a  
15 question to put on behalf of the members of the Tribunal

16 Witness, you say that the army staffs had  
17 nothing to do with policy. You also say that your  
18 report, that is exhibit No. 2671 which deals with  
19 policy was sent by you to the army General Staff. How  
20 do you explain the apparent contradiction?

21 THE WITNESS: I do not say that the General  
22 Staff had no connection whatsoever with the national  
23 policy. What I meant was that they do not have the power  
24 nor the duty nor the authority to decide on national  
25

KASAHARA

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1 policy. National policy is decided by the participa-  
2 tion of government as well as by participation of the  
3 army, for instance, General Staff and War Ministry.  
4 Now any national policy that has to do with defense,  
5 the forming of such with the national defense, the  
6 forming of such policy, of course, is participated in  
7 by the General Staff.

8 THE PRESIDENT: I refer to the record page  
9 23,197.

10 The witness was about to say something. Let  
11 him continue.

12 THE WITNESS: I made a report of my opinions  
13 as an attache attached to the embassy. I thought that  
14 was within my function because these had to do with  
15 the problem of national defense and it is permissible  
16 for anyone to make recommendation by or submit opinions  
17 regarding the national policy.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel.

19 BY COLONEL IVANOV: (Continued)

20 Q I asked that the witness be shown exhibit 779.  
21 Was the exhibit handed to you, witness?

22 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
23 to the witness.)

24 Q (Continuing) I will read to you, Mr. Witness,  
25 excerpt from exhibit 779, that is, the resolution

KASAHARA

CROSS

1 adopted by the Imperial conference on July 2, 1941.  
2 Follow my reading. I quote page 2 of the English  
3 translation, paragraph 1. (Reading:)

4 "Though the spirit of the tripartite axis  
5 will form the keynote of our attitude toward the  
6 German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while,  
7 but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms  
8 against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic  
9 negotiations will be continued with detailed precau-  
10 tions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet  
11 war progress favourable to Japan we shall execute arms  
12 to solve the northern problems, thereby securing sta-  
13 bility in the Northern regions."

14 Tell us, Mr. Witness, did not the contents of  
15 the resolution adopted at the Imperial conference  
16 determine the main points of Japan's attitude towards  
17 the Soviet Union in connection with the outbreak of  
18 the Soviet-German war?

19 A At that time I was a divisional commander and  
20 I am not well acquainted or well informed with the  
21 details of what occurred domestically, that is, matters  
22 such as what items were discussed at the Imperial Con-  
23 ference.  
24

25 THE PRESIDENT: I do not think he will help  
us very much on that phase.

KASAHARA

CROSS

1 Q Mr. Witness, tell us did not the Kan-tokuen  
2 plan provide for the secret carrying out of preparatory  
3 measures for the war against the Soviet Union in  
4 accordance with the resolution of the conference  
5 which I just read?

6 A As far as I know I believe it was not plans  
7 to carry out an aggressive war against the Soviet  
8 Union. Preparations in the event that an attack came  
9 from the Soviet side were not adequate and therefore  
10 these preparations were made to meet this situation.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Any questions directed to get  
12 him to say Japan was guilty of aggression are futile.

13 Q Will you tell us, Mr. Witness, do you give  
14 the data concerning the military forces of the Soviet  
15 Union on the basis of the estimation of Japanese  
16 intelligence organs, isn't it so?

17 A Some are based on such estimates and some  
18 are not. It is based on a general information gained  
19 from all of these sources.

20 Q You do not avail yourself of any trustworthy  
21 documentary data on the U. S. S. R. armed forces which  
22 you can produce to the Court, do you?

23 A I do not have any data at the present time  
24 which I can present to the Tribunal.

25 Q So the numerous data which you give dividing

KASAHARA

CROSS

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2 plan provide for the secret carrying out of preparatory  
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KASAHARA

CROSS

1       them by separate years and concerning all branches of  
2       service of the Soviet army you give only from your  
3       memory, isn't it so?

4           A     In view of the fact that I was a section chief  
5       concerned with Russian affairs in the army I felt that  
6       compared to the other officers I was much better in-  
7       formed with regard to information intelligence concern-  
8       ing the Soviet -- correction: in view of the fact that  
9       the greater part of my life has been devoted to  
10      Russian affairs I feel that compared to other persons  
11      I am more qualified and better informed with regard  
12      to matters concerning the Soviet.

13           THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow being a holiday,  
14      proclaimed by the Supreme Commander, this Tribunal  
15      will not sit.

16                We will recess for 15 minutes.

17                   (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
18      taken until 1100, after which the proceedings  
19      were resumed as follows:)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

4 BY COLONEL IVANOV (Continued):

5 Q Mr. Witness, is not the information given  
6 by you that the USSR in 1932 allegedly -- in 1933  
7 allegedly had three million soldiers in the army an  
8 obvious fantasy?

9 A It was not a mere guess. It was based on  
10 estimates which were based on facts. They were based  
11 on estimates, of course, but these estimates had  
12 certain foundations.

13 Q Then, how can your contentions made in your  
14 affidavit be reconciled with the statements made by  
15 you in 1931, in which you said that the USSR was  
16 unable to wage war and feared for an invasion?

17 A Yes, I said so. The capacity to wage war can  
18 not be decided merely by the number of troops.

19 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, by putting  
20 this question I wanted to test the credibility of the  
21 Witness KASAHARA. I refer the attention of the  
22 honorable Members of the Tribunal to exhibit 696 and  
23 2671.

24 By this I finish my cross-examination, because  
25 I consider it useless to continue it.

KASAHARA

REDIRECT

1 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

3 BY MR. BLAKENEY:

4 Q Mr. Witness, referring you to exhibit 702;  
5 from this, part of paragraph 1 was read to you con-  
6 cerning the purported decision that preparations for  
7 waging war against Russia should be completed before  
8 the middle of 1934, and you have testified concerning  
9 the meaning of that. Now, I want to ask you whether  
10 in the same paragraph you do not make the following  
11 statement, which was not read to you:

12 "This is, however, not the intention of the  
13 entire army."

14 Does that statement also appear in the message  
15 of Lieutenant Colonel KANDA purporting to report your  
16 statement?

17 A Yes, it appears in that.

18 Q And will you state the meaning of that phrase  
19 in connection with the remainder of the paragraph?

20 A As I have stated before, I have no definite  
21 recollection as to the exact wording or phrasing of  
22 this message; but judging from the facts at that time,  
23 the facts are that both the General Staff and the War  
24 Office -- in the General Staff and the War Office the  
25 section chiefs had a tentative agreement for a war

KASAHARA

REDIRECT

1 against the Soviet Union -- not war, but military  
2 preparations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. And when  
3 the problem was approached concretely, it was discovered  
4 that from the standpoint of materials and expenses,  
5 such preparations could not be carried out, and there  
6 were many among the military who did not agree with  
7 these plans. Therefore, I know that at that time  
8 there were many people who ~~opposed~~ such plans in order  
9 to secure--

10 THE MONITOR: And I know that at that time there  
11 were many people who were opposed to this idea that a  
12 war with Soviet Union was necessary to secure Manchuria.

13 A (Continuing) Therefore, no decisions were  
14 made with regard to a war against the Soviet Union.

15 Q Did the decision or plan or whatever it may  
16 have been of the section chiefs become policy of the  
17 Army General Staff?

18 A No, they were not adopted by the General Staff.

19 Q And in connection with exhibit No. 696, from  
20 which also selections were read to you in cross-  
21 examination, I wish to remind you that you were cross-  
22 examined in connection with this document which is  
23 entitled "Summary of an Address Made to His Excellency  
24 HARADA by Lieutenant Colonel KASAHARA." You were  
25 cross-examined in connection with it on the 10th of

KASAHARA

REDIRECT

October of last year. Have you that document there?

1

A No, I do not have it.

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1 MR. BLAKENEY: Let it be handed to him, please.

2 (Whereupon, a document was handed to  
3 the witness.)

4 Q I want you to look at the document, especially  
5 paragraph 2-f thereof, and read to the Tribunal, or  
6 confirm that what I read is contained in that paragraph,  
7 paragraph f being headed "Militarization of the people.

8 "All of her efforts are bent on the militariza-  
9 tion of the public.

10 "Ocoabuayum (Osoabeahem) - Society for Aircraft  
11 Lookout and Gas and Chemical Lookout.

12 "In January the year before last, 3,000,000, in  
13 January last year, 5,000,000, in January this year,  
14 9,000,000.

15 The effect is infiltrated even into the kinder-  
16 garten."

17 Does that appear there as part of that summary  
18 of an address?

19 A Yes, it is included.

20 Q Did facts which you observed as military attache  
21 in the U.S.S.R. lead you to this conclusion which you  
22 have here stated, that all of the efforts of the U.S.S.R.  
23 were devoted to militarization of the public?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Did you actually visit schools and even



KASAHARA

REDIRECT

1 kindergartens and discover facts upon which you made  
2 this statement?

3 A Yes, I did visit kindergartens.

4 This Osoabeahem, which is a National Defense  
5 Aeronautics Sciences -- the figures are based on what  
6 appeared in Russian newspapers so I believe they are  
7 accurate.

8 THE MONITOR: The word is National Defense  
9 Aeronautics Science Society.

10 Q And continuing with the same document, paragraph  
11 3 "Conclusion." Tell me whether the following words  
12 appear there as part of the summary of this purported  
13 address:

14 "In short, it is self-evident that Soviet  
15 Russia will change her policy from passive defense  
16 to aggression in the future as her economic power and  
17 defense are completed."

18 Does that appear there?

19 A Yes, that is the way I thought.

20 Q And was that opinion of yours concerning the  
21 probability of Soviet -- of a Soviet policy of aggres-  
22 sion the basis of your recommendations concerning the  
23 Soviet policy at that time?

24 A Yes, that is so.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

KASAHARA

REDIRECT

1 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, may I make an  
2 objection? The defense counsel started asking leading  
3 questions. It is inadmissible. I ask to delete from  
4 the transcript the question and the part of the answer  
5 of the witness which he gave.

6 THE PRESIDENT: The question undoubtedly did  
7 suggest the answer. But the answer, it only goes to  
8 probative value at this stage. It weakens the value  
9 of the answer.

10 Q Now, coming to the report made by you in March  
11 1931, which is exhibit 2671. Will you state whether  
12 this report was made by order of the General Staff or  
13 on your own initiative?

14 A That is a report that I made on my own volition.

15 Q Were reports of this type often made by mili-  
16 tary attaches?

17 A I did not make such reports often, but only  
18 once. I felt that there was no objection to making a  
19 report of such a nature.

20 Q After you returned to Japan and were attached  
21 to the General Staff office did you learn what disposi-  
22 tion was made of this report?

23 A Yes, I do.

24 Q State what you learned in that connection?

25 A My report was not adopted at all by either the

KASAHARA

REDIRECT

1 War Office or the General Staff. I heard that it was  
2 abandoned, disregarded, as the opinions of an immature  
3 observer. The fact that national defenses should be  
4 strengthened was not of course objected to, but the  
5 advocacy of war against the U.S.S.R. was of course  
6 totally disregarded.

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Q During the time that you served in the  
1 General Staff Office after your return from Moscow,  
2 did the General Staff draw any such plans for aggres-  
3 sive war against Russia?  
4

A As I have already stated, no such plans were  
5 made.  
6

Q In a question addressed to you some time ago,  
7 you were asked concerning the functions of the Gen-  
8 eral Staff in connection with drawing war plans; and  
9 you made some explanations of the functions of the  
10 General Staff in that regard. I wish to ask you  
11 whether, in addition to what you have already ex-  
12 plained, it was or was not part of the General Staff  
13 functions, in the event of the drafting of war plans  
14 by the government, to confer with the government.  
15

A When war plans are drawn up by the govern-  
16 ment, I believe that, naturally, the government would  
17 consult the General Staff.  
18

Q And from what sources does the General Staff  
19 expect to obtain materials for presentation to the  
20 government in case of such consultation?  
21

THE PRESIDENT: We do not need this enlight-  
22 enment. We know that governments have General Staffs  
23 to consult them, and we know where General Staffs  
24 get their information.  
25

KASAHARA

REDIRECT

1 Q. You need not answer, Mr. Witness.

2 Do the duties of the military attache con-  
3 sist of obtaining information of value to the General  
4 Staff only?

5 A No, that is not so. Although the military  
6 attache does come under the General Staff -- Chief  
7 of the General Staff, the duty of the military  
8 attache consists in studying and investigation of  
9 everything that has to do with military matters,  
10 for instance, the military training, the military  
11 administration, the organization of the army, and so  
12 forth.

13 Q Coming to your period with the Kwantung Army,  
14 at the time you went there as Chief of Staff of the  
15 Kwantung Army, were you still of the same opinion  
16 concerning the necessity for war against the USSR  
17 that you were in 1931?

18 A No, I did not. I felt that a war against  
19 the Soviet Union should be avoided by all means.

20 Q What had occurred to cause you to change  
21 that opinion?

22 THE PRESIDENT: We are not concerned with  
23 his fluctuations of opinion. So far as he reduced  
24 his opinions to writing and sent them on to this  
25 General Staff and they were entertained, they are



KASAHARA

REDIRECT

1 relevant, of course. We do not want his opinions.  
2 There were millions of Japanese soldiers, and they  
3 all had opinions of one sort or another, and we do  
4 not want to know what they were. He is not here to  
5 attempt any personal justification. He is here to  
6 tell us what he told the General Staff and what he  
7 knows of the attitude of the General Staff and the  
8 Japanese Government in relation to war. It does not  
9 affect his credibility either.

10 MR. BLAKENEY: I quite agree, your Honor;  
11 And, of course, I did not ask the witness for his  
12 opinion; I asked him why he changed it.

13 THE PRESIDENT: I said we do not want to  
14 know what were the fluctuations of his personal  
15 opinions, nor do we. How will it help, Mr. Blakeney?

16 MR. BLAKENEY: I am quite willing to leave  
17 it at that. The subject has been opened by the  
18 prosecution as to what this witness' opinions were  
19 some ten years earlier. I agree they are quite im-  
20 material to the position of the Kwantung Army in 1941-  
21 '45.

22  
23 I understand that it is desired to put one  
24 or two questions on reexamination on behalf of Mr.  
25 HIROTA.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, counsellor.

KASAHARA

REDIRECT

1           REDIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

2   BY MR. HANAI:

3           Q   It is said that you submitted a report to  
4   the General Staff concerning a conversation with  
5   HIROTA. Did you do that on HIROTA's orders?

6           A   No, I did not make the report to the General  
7   Staff. The report was written -- addressed to Major  
8   General HARADA. It was written at his request. He  
9   requested that I write the conversation that took  
10   place between Mr. HIROTA and myself -- and Major  
11   General HARADA.

12           THE MONITOR: Correction: Major General  
13   HARADA had a conversation with Ambassador HIROTA.  
14   At that time Major General HARADA asked me to put  
15   this conversation in writing. I did not submit this  
16   as a report to the General Staff. Neither is it a  
17   report written at the order or request of Ambassador  
18   HIROTA.

19           Q   Did Ambassador HIROTA know that you had  
20   written this report -- what you had written after  
21   this conversation?  
22   this conversation?

23           A   I believe that he did not know.

24           MR. HANAI: That is all, sir.

25           MR. BLAKENEY: I ask that the witness be  
released on the usual terms.

KASAHARA

REDIRECT

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21      this conversation?  
22      this conversation?

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24           MR. HANAI: That is all, sir.

25           MR. BLAKENEY: I ask that the witness be  
            released on the usual terms.

THE PRESIDENT: He is released accordingly.

(Whereupon, the witness was ex-  
cused.)

- - -

1 MR. BLAKENEY: I next read from Prosecution  
2 Exhibit 703, the affidavit of General USHIROKU Jun;  
3 first in connection with the so-called Otsu Plan of  
4 1935, which has been shown by the prosecution's evi-  
5 dence to have been the ordinary annual operations  
6 plan to be used in case of hostilities with the USSR.

7 I read from page 4, starting with the fourth  
8 question:

9 "Q What kind of attack plans did you make up  
10 according to the OTSU plan of 1935?

11 "A It was planned that the main attack should  
12 be directed to the east, i.e., the Pogranichnaya,  
13 and that in the Heiho and Hailar area we should be  
14 on the defensive. But, afterwards in 1939, I knew  
15 in the OTSU plan that supplementary attack should be  
16 carried out in the north and south of the main attack  
17 line. Yet, the attack areas changed with year.

18 "Q Was it contemplated to carry out landing  
19 operations with ships according to the OTSU plan of  
20 1935?

21 "A When success was achieved in the main attack  
22 in Manchuria (airforce operation) a landing operation  
23 was planned to land one division in Amerika Bay to  
24 divert the Russian Army and to facilitate the oper-  
25 ations in the main attack area.



1 "Q What was the aim of the war according to  
2 the plan of 1935?

3 "A I did not know the true aim, but its opera-  
4 tional aim was to occupy Maritime Provinces and to  
5 eliminate air-raids upon Japan proper by the air-  
6 forces of the Soviet Union Army."

7 I will skip the next two questions and an-  
8 swers, which were read by the prosecution.

9 "Q What kind of plans of operations against  
10 USSR was laid down in 1939, when you were Chief of  
11 the Army in Peian?

12 A The aim of the 4th Army under my command  
13 was to defend the Sunuri, Aigun and Haiho areas by  
14 one division and the frontier guards. In case of  
15 outbreak of war, one division was to be reinforced  
16 in the 1st month of war, and one more in the 2nd  
17 month. But, in fact, at the beginning of war we had  
18 troops only capable of defending the above-mentioned  
19 areas.

20 "Q What kind of plans of operation was laid  
21 down in 1944, when you were the Vice-Chief of the  
22 General Staff?

23 "A The operations against USSR at the time when  
24 I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff were planned  
25 to be the defensive ones in each front."

1 "Q What was the aim of the war according to  
2 the plan of 1935?

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22 General Staff?

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24 I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff were planned  
25 to be the defensive ones in each front."

1 I skip the next question and answer and  
2 begin reading at the top of page 5:

3 "Q State the process of the reinforcements of  
4 Manchurian aviation from the standpoint of ex-Inspector  
5 General of Aviation in Japan.

6 "A The airforce of Manchuria immediately after  
7 the Manchurian Incident was very weak, but, by the  
8 commenced large reinforcement in 1937, the strength  
9 of the 1st line was 24 flying companies (240  
10 aeroplanes) in 1938, 34 companies (339 aeroplanes)  
11 in 1941--"

12 I am sorry, my punctuation was wrong:

13 "in 1938, 34 companies (339 aeroplanes),  
14 in 1941, 49 companies (about 600 aeroplanes). The  
15 whole aviation corps belonged to the 2nd and 5th  
16 aviation divisions.

17 "Q State the kinds of aeroplanes concentrated  
18 into Manchuria. Which kind of aeroplanes was many  
19 in number, fighters, bombers or scout planes?

20 "A Fighters were the greatest in number and  
21 bombers were the next, but, I cannot tell you ex-  
22 actly the number of them.

23 "Q State the plan of employing the aviation  
24 corps of 1941 in Manchuria.

25 "A In case of the outbreak of war, the main

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21 bombers were the next, but, I cannot tell you ex-  
22 actly the number of them.

23 "Q State the plan of employing the aviation  
24 corps of 1941 in Manchuria.

25 "A In case of the outbreak of war, the main

1 forces of them would be to proper the operations of  
2 the Japanese Army by means of making an attack and of  
3 bringing a pressure on the east, i. e., the Soviet  
4 Union Army stationing in Maritime Province.

5 "Q How was the plan of operations at the time  
6 when you were Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Area Army  
7 of Kwantung Army?

8 "A Concerning the plans of employing the Area  
9 Army at the time when I was Commander-in-Chief of the  
10 3rd Area Army, between the 1st and the 2nd plans was  
11 found quite a difference. The 3rd Area Army contem-  
12 plated enforcing defensive operations in the Heiho,  
13 Hailar, and Wuchakow areas till May 1945, that is,  
14 the 4th Army was planned to occupy Sunwu, Aigun and  
15 Heiho areas, the 119th Division to occupy the Hailar  
16 area, and the 107th Division the Wuchakow area.

17 Since the beginning of June 1945 the above plans were  
18 empletely changed. The Area Army Headquarters had a  
19 new command upon the 30th and 44th Armies, having  
20 been transferred from Chichehaerh to Mukden, and the  
21 44th Army was engaged in defending the Wuchakow-  
22 Taonan-Tunglias line, the Army Headquarters was lo-  
23 cated in Liasyuan and the 30th Army took the defen-  
24 sive in the Kilin, Changchou and Ssupinchieh areas.  
25

"Q How was the plan of operations at that time?



1 "A The plan of operations made the 44th Army  
2 bound to stand on the defensive in the vicinities of  
3 Wuchakow, Toanan and Tunglias.

4 "Q How was the process of the operations of  
5 the 3rd Area Army at the beginning of war between  
6 Japan and U. S. S. R?

7 "A At the outbreak of Russo-Japanese War in  
8 Aug. 1945, having made the 44th Army retreat from  
9 the already occupied positions to the Mukden and  
10 Siasyang areas and by so doing establish a secret  
11 connection with the 30th Army, I placed the 3rd  
12 Area Army on the defensive in the Kilin-Chanchieh-  
13 Mukden-Siasyang line. Particularly I made the 180th  
14 division retreat from Jeho to Chinhou and then re-  
15 treat to the south (Liaoyang) in view of the diffi-  
16 cult defence. The defence line of Kilin-Changchun-  
17 Ssupingchieh-Mukden-Liaoyang was not the last one  
18 of the Japanese Army. If the war would turn un-  
19 favourable for our Army, we should intend to retreat  
20 to the Jungfu and Antung Provinces, where our final  
21 resistance would be tried against the Soviet Union  
22 Army. This was to be the very last defence line  
23 in Manchuria. This plan of operation, however,  
24 was not put in practice, being a mere plan of re-  
25 treat. Therefore, on August 15th, 1945 when the

1 telegram signed by the Emperor ordering to disarm  
2 our Army unconditionally was sent to me, the 3rd  
3 Area Army was still stationed in the Kilin-Chang-  
4 chun-Liaoyang line."  
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YANO

DIRECT

1 Leaving General USHIROKU's testimony for  
2 the time being, I call as a witness YANO, Masao who,  
3 for a time, was Chief of Staff for General USHIROKU.  
4 His testimony is recorded in document 1155.

5 - - -

6 M A S A O Y A N O, called as a witness on behalf  
7 of the defense, being first duly sworn, testi-  
8 fied through Japanese interpreters as follows:

9 DIRECT EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. BLAKENEY:

11 Q Mr. Witness, will you please state your  
12 name and address.

13 A My address is, the City of Fukuoka, Nagahama-  
14 cho, 2 Chome, No. 55. My name, YANO, Masao.

15 MR. BLAKENEY: I ask that the witness be  
16 handed defense document 1155.

17 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
18 to the witness.)

19 Q And I ask you, Mr. Witness, to examine that  
20 and state whether it is your affidavit bearing your  
21 signature and seal.

22 A There is no mistake.

23 Q Are the contents true and correct?

24 A There is no mistake.

25 MR. BLAKENEY: The affidavit, defense

YANO

DIRECT

document 1155, is offered in evidence.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

2 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1155

3 will receive exhibit No. 2672.

4 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
5 ferred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
6 2672 and received in evidence.)  
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YANO

DIRECT

1 MR. BLAKENEY: I now read the affidavit which,  
2 omitting the formal parts, is as follows:

3 "I am an ex-Lieutenant General of the Japa-  
4 nese Army, and now living at No. 55 2 Chome Nagaha-  
5 macho, Fukuoka.

6 "Since November 1944 I served as the Chief  
7 of Staff of the Third District Army under General  
8 Ushiroku's command, and stayed in Tsitsihar until  
9 March 1945. I subsequently became commander of the  
10 57th Division and went to 'Hanshinfu'. Upon my  
11 arrival there I received an order from the Kwantung  
12 Army and was transferred along with my division from  
13 Manchuria to Fukuoka for joining in the Pacific War.

14 "I was connected with the drawing up of the  
15 plan of operations of the Third District Army for the  
16 year 1945 while I was the Chief of Staff of that Army.  
17 The circumstances are stated as follows:

18 "Although I am not well acquainted with the  
19 plan of operations before 1945, I knew that the out-  
20 line of the plan was to defend against possible  
21 attacks of the USSR, the line of the right bank of  
22 the Amour River in the north, and the line of Hailar  
23 and Great Hsingan mountains in the west. However,  
24 when I arrived there, I received a new instruction  
25 regarding new operation plans from the headquarters



YANO

DIRECT

1 MR. BLAKENEY: I now read the affidavit which,  
2 omitting the formal parts, is as follows:

3 "I am an ex-Lieutenant General of the Japa-  
4 nese Army, and now living at No. 55 2 Chome Nagaha-  
5 macho, Fukuoka.

6 "Since November 1944 I served as the Chief  
7 of Staff of the Third District Army under General  
8 Ushiroku's command, and stayed in Tsitsihar until  
9 March 1945. I subsequently became commander of the  
10 57th Division and went to 'Sanshinfu'. Upon my  
11 arrival there I received an order from the Kwantung  
12 Army and was transferred along with my division from  
13 Manchuria to Fukuoka for joining in the Pacific War.

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15 plan of operations of the Third District Army for the  
16 year 1945 while I was the Chief of Staff of that Army.  
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18 "Although I am not well acquainted with the  
19 plan of operations before 1945, I knew that the out-  
20 line of the plan was to defend against possible  
21 attacks of the USSR, the line of the right bank of  
22 the Amour River in the north, and the line of Hailar  
23 and Great Hsingan mountains in the west. However,  
24 when I arrived there, I received a new instruction  
25 regarding new operation plans from the headquarters

YANO

DIRECT

1 of the Kwantung Army. According to this, the Third  
2 District Army was to make gradual retreat after  
3 offering a slight resistance in the area of Songo  
4 and Hailar, and was to make the final resistance on  
5 the line of Peian, Nonko, Jarantong and Hsingan.  
6 Following this instruction, the Third District Army  
7 drew up a concrete plan and when the plan was about  
8 to be reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwan-  
9 tung Army, I was transferred.

10 "At that time the Third District Army was  
11 composed of three divisions and one brigade. The  
12 divisions were the 57th, 107th and 119th, and only  
13 the 57th division was well seasoned, the others being  
14 newly organized inferior divisions.

15 "I became the commander of this well season-  
16 ed 57th Division. However, this division was also  
17 transferred to Japan proper for the Pacific War. A  
18 newly organized division was substituted for it, thus  
19 rendering all divisions of the Third Army inferior in  
20 quality.

21 "After I arrived in Japan proper, I was told  
22 that the headquarters of the Third District Army was  
23 transferred from Tsitsihar to Mukden."  
24

25 MR. BLAKENEY: You may cross-examine.

YANO

DIRECT

1 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

2 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, I refer the  
3 Members of the Tribunal to exhibits 703, 722, 837,  
4 839A. Confining themselves to reference to these  
5 exhibits, the prosecution is not going to cross-  
6 examine this witness.

7 MR. BLAKENEY: Then I ask that the witness  
8 be released on the usual terms.

9 THE PRESIDENT: He is released accordingly.

10 (Whereupon, the witness was ex-  
11 cused.)

12 We will adjourn now until half-past one.

13 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
14 taken.)

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## AFTERNOON SESSION

1  
2 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess,  
3 at 1330.  
4

5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

8 MR. BLAKENEY: As additional evidence that  
9 the plans of the Japanese Army vis-a-vis the USSR  
10 were at all times drawn from the point of view of  
11 defense, I shall read some excerpts from prosecution  
12 exhibit 837, the affidavit of Major-General OTSUBO  
13 Kazuma. From page 5, commencing with the sixth  
14 answer, in which the witness discusses the Japanese  
15 operations plans for 1942 and 1943:

16 "At the first stage of the war against  
17 Soviet, the First front was to attack and occupy  
18 the Soviet Maritime Province. The Fourth Army of  
19 the Second front, by engaging in the diversional  
20 movement in the Blagoveshchensk District, was to cut  
21 off the Trans-Siberia Main Line, give a blow to this  
22 supply line, and facilitate the action of the First  
23 front which was in charge of the most important duty.  
24 The duty of the Sixth Army was to hold the Red Army  
25 from invading into Manchuria from Zabaikalye and

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engage in the defensive action.

1 "Q Were these plans of the Kwantung Army  
2 offensive plans?

3 "A Yes, in the eastern district, the plans  
4 of operations against Soviet were offensive."  
5

6 I pass now to page 7, the second answer  
7 of which I shall read the first 2 paragraphs.

8 "In 1945, the duty of the 3rd front was to  
9 interrupt the advance of the Soviet Army in the vicinity  
10 of Chaonan, Wuchakow, and Tungliao in Manchuria.  
11 According to the plan of operations in 1945, the  
12 main forces of the third front should take up  
13 positions in the districts of Mukden, Supingchieh,  
14 and Hsinking, and if the enemies would come to  
15 attack, should destroy them in these districts."

16 I omit the remainder.

17 Further on the 1943 operations plans, I  
18 read from prosecution exhibit 833, the affidavit of  
19 Major MATSUURA Kusuo, page 4, the third and fourth  
20 paragraphs of the last answer.

21 "The 1st Area Army consisted of the 2nd,  
22 3rd, 5th and the 20th Armies, and its headquarters  
23 were stationed at Mutanchiang. The object of the  
24 Army lay in the hostile operations against the Red  
25 Army in the occupation of the Soviet Maritime Province.



1 "The 2nd Area Army consisted of the 4th  
2 and the 6th Armies, and its headquarters were stationed  
3 at Chichihaerh. The object of the Army lay in the  
4 defensive operations towards the west, with the  
5 object of covering the offensive of the 1st Area  
6 Army."

7 In connection with the question of the  
8 celebrated "Kantokuen" -- this being the abbreviated  
9 form of the Japanese for "Kwantung Army Special  
10 Maneuver" -- there is already a considerable amount  
11 of evidence in the record. Returning to prosecution  
12 exhibit 703, the interrogation of General USHIROKU,  
13 I shall read from page 4 the last question and answer,  
14 which unqualifiedly confirms the testimony of General  
15 KASAHARA that the Kantokuen was nothing more than a  
16 reinforcement of the Kwantung Army.

17 "Q Do you know anything about "Kan-Toku-En"  
18 plan?

19 "A In September 1944, in Chichihaerh I  
20 knew of it for the first time from Chief of the  
21 3rd Area Army Staff, Major-General WATANABE, Hiroshi,  
22 "Kan-Toku-En" meant the reinforcement of the 13  
23 divisions stationed in Manchuria and the transferring  
24 of the 51st and 57th divisions into Manchuria. I  
25 myself was then in Kwantung and knew of the above."

That is all I read at that point.

Similarly, in prosecution exhibit 670, TAKEBE's interrogation, we find on page 2 the following question and answer further proving that the Kantokuen had no purpose other than the simple one of reinforcement; I am reading the second question from the end of the page.

"Q What kind of orders did you receive from the War Minister?

"A I didn't receive any concrete orders from the War Minister. For instance, the situation just after the beginning of the Russo-German War not being clear, I went to TOJO by aeroplane to make sure whether reinforcement of the Kwantung Army meant the opening of a war against Soviet Russia. War Minister TOJO said only that it was necessary to reinforce the Kwantung Army and didn't explain the reason."

Another of the prosecution witnesses who testified in absentia, Major-General OTSUBO, makes quite clear in his affidavit the innocent character of the Kantokuen. From prosecution exhibit 837 I read from page 3, commencing with the second answer.

"A The special purpose of the 'Kan-Toku-En'

TANAKA

1 plan was the speedy training of troops for the  
2 emergency of war. It was difficult to practice the  
3 training in the Japanese homeland.

4 "Q Were these the troops prepared for the  
5 war against Soviet according to the plan of the  
6 'Kan-Toku-En' in 1941-42?

7 "A These were the troops to be used, for  
8 example, in the wars against Soviet, the United  
9 States, or Britain, according to the changes in  
10 international situation."

11 Lieutenant-General TOMINAGA, in his affidavit,  
12 prosecution exhibit 705, says (page 6): "Kantokuen  
13 plan was formed by Major-General TANAKA Shinichi,  
14 the successor of my post of the Chief of 1st Depart-  
15 ment of General Staff Headquarters in the middle of  
16 1941."

17 I call as my next witness Lieutenant-General  
18 TANAKA, Shinichi, whose testimony is embodied in  
19 defense document 1323.

20 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: Mr. President, the  
21 witness TANAKA, Shinichi is in court and has previously  
22 testified before this Tribunal.

23  
24  
25

1 THE PRESIDENT: The accused TOJO is  
2 not in court. He is interviewing his counsel,  
3 with the permission of the Tribunal.

4 Colonel Ivanov.

5 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, the defense  
6 violates the rule made by the Tribunal providing  
7 for the service of the affidavit on the prosecu-  
8 tion in proper time. TANAKA's own affidavit was  
9 served upon the prosecution at 1605 hours yester-  
10 day, that is, after the end of the session of the  
11 court. I ask that, in connection with the affi-  
12 davit, the ruling of the Tribunal be followed.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

14 MR. BLAKENEY: The affidavit is quite a  
15 long one and I think will take the better part of  
16 the afternoon to read. Any deficiency of a few  
17 minutes from the 24 hours required prior to cross-  
18 examination will certainly be no greater than the  
19 defense often cheerfully accepted or in cases was  
20 forced to accept.

21 COLONEL IVANOV: I must state to the  
22 Tribunal that having no possibility of reading  
23 this affidavit previously, we have no opportunity  
24 to prepare our objections to the affidavit itself  
25 and to point out the parts to which we object.

1 MR. BLAKENEY: They have had twenty-two  
2 hours, according to their statement.

3 THE PRESIDENT: How long is it?

4 MR. BLAKENEY: Quite long. It runs to  
5 fourteen single-spaced typed pages.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Can you go on with another  
7 witness or document?

8 MR. BLAKENEY: Yes, of course I can, sir,  
9 but it won't contribute to the logical presentation  
10 of the case.

11 THE PRESIDENT: A Member of the Court  
12 also says he did not receive his copy at the time  
13 directed by the rule.

14 I think you had better go ahead with  
15 something else, Major Blakeney.

16 MR. BLAKENEY: Then, I ask that the wit-  
17 ness be stood down.

18 THE PRESIDENT: He is stood down.

19 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

20 MR. BLAKENEY: I now offer in evidence  
21 defense document 1154, the affidavit of Major  
22 General MATSUMURA Tomokatsu, who testified on behalf  
23 of the prosecution on the 18th of October, 1946,  
24 transcript page 8,138.  
25

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual



terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document  
2 1154 will receive exhibit No. 2673.

3 (Whereupon, the document above  
4 referred to was marked defense exhibit 2673  
5 and received in evidence.)

6 MR. BLAKENEY: I shall read from this  
7 affidavit certain parts as proof of the nature of  
8 the operations plans of the Kwantung Army. I  
9 commence with the fourth question on page 2:

10 "Q How were the Kwantung Army's operations  
11 plans made?

12 "A They were made on the basis of the instruc-  
13 tions of the central army authorities.

14 "Q Were they made during your tenure of  
15 office?

16 "A In 1943, the plan for 1942 was simply  
17 followed, as there was no instruction that year; but  
18 in 1944 and 1945 they were prepared on the basis  
19 of the instructions from Tokyo.

20 "Q Would you say that none of the operations  
21 plans was made by the Kwantung Army alone?

22 "A Yes.

23 "Q Were the contents or nature of the opera-  
24 tions plans changed each year?  
25

1 "A In 1942 it was planned in the event of  
2 hostilities to take the offensive with the main  
3 forces against the Maritime Province. The plan of  
4 1943 simply followed that of 1942. In 1944 the  
5 plan for making an offensive was abandoned and that  
6 of defense at the border line was adopted. In  
7 1945, to check the Soviet offensive with gradual  
8 retreats into Manchuria and to use the mountain  
9 district of southeastern Manchuria as the last line  
10 became the plan for that year.

11 "Q What was the reason for adopting the  
12 strategy of the offensive against the Maritime  
13 Province?

14 "A I do not know about its reason, as no  
15 explanation was given by the central Army authorities,  
16 but our duty was to paralyse their air bases by  
17 occupying the Maritime Province.

18 "Q Was general operations scheme against the  
19 Soviet Far Eastern territory shown in the instruc-  
20 tions of the operations plan?

21 "A No over-all operations plan for the Soviet  
22 Far Eastern territory was indicated to us.

23 "Q Were the operations plans shown to units  
24 under the command of the Kwantung Army?

25 "A The commanders-in-chief of the various

1 "A In 1942 it was planned in the event of  
2 hostilities to take the offensive with the main  
3 forces against the Maritime Province. The plan of  
4 1943 simply followed that of 1942. In 1944 the  
5 plan for making an offensive was abandoned and that  
6 of defense at the border line was adopted. In  
7 1945, to check the Soviet offensive with gradual  
8 retreats into Manchuria and to use the mountain  
9 district of southeastern Manchuria as the last line  
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12 strategy of the offensive against the Maritime  
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15 explanation was given by the central Army authorities,  
16 but our duty was to paralyse their air bases by  
17 occupying the Maritime Province.

18 "Q Was general operations scheme against the  
19 Soviet Far Eastern territory shown in the instruc-  
20 tions of the operations plan?

21 "A No over-all operations plan for the Soviet  
22 Far Eastern territory was indicated to us.

23 "Q Were the operations plans shown to units  
24 under the command of the Kwantung Army?

25 "A The commanders-in-chief of the various

1 armies were shown only the excerpts of the matters  
2 connected with them. They were forbidden to show  
3 them to the units under their command or other units.

4 "Q Did a divisional commander know matters  
5 in his charge?

6 "A Nothing concerning the operations plan  
7 was shown to divisional commanders.

8 "Q Was utilization of White Russians contem-  
9 plated in the operations plans?

10 "A Absolutely not.

11 "Q How was the time for commencement of  
12 operations stipulated in the instructions regard-  
13 ing the operations plan?

14 "A The instructions for operations showed  
15 only plans and preparations and contained no men-  
16 tion as to the time for commencement of operations.

17 "Q Could the Kwantung Army start an opera-  
18 tion of its own accord?

19 "A No, it could not start an operation by  
20 its arbitrary decision. Everything was to be done  
21 on instructions from the central authorities.

22 "Q That was to be done if it was attacked by  
23 the Soviet forces?

24 "A We were to fight in self-defence; but the  
25 principle was that instructions from the central

authorities.

1 "Q What was to be done if it was attacked  
2 by the Soviet forces?

3 "A We were to fight in self-defence; but  
4 the principle was that instructions from the central  
5 authorities were to be awaited concerning the carry-  
6 ing out of operations plans."

7  
8 I skip four questions and answers, resum-  
9 ing with the last question on the page:

10 "Q What was your estimate of the Soviet  
11 Far Eastern Army's strength while you were there?

12 "A Sniper Divisions 20 - 30

13 Tanks 1,000 - 1,200

14 Planes 1,000 - 1,500

15 "Strength of the troops 700,000 - 800,000  
16 men. It was estimated that it would be increased  
17 to from 30 to 40 divisions if and when war came  
18 (according to the information in the hands of the  
19 Second Section of the Kwantung Army).

20 "Q What was the military strength of the  
21 Kwantung Army during your tenure of office?

22 "A At the time of summer, 1943, its strength  
23 was as follows: Divisions, 13. Tank divisions, 2  
24 (about 900 tanks). Air divisions, 2 (about 700-  
25 800 planes). Strength of the troops, about 600,000



1 officers and men. Since the autumn of the same year  
2 the numbers of tanks and airplanes decreased remark-  
3 ably.

4 "Q What was the state of the replenishment  
5 of the personnel of a division and its strength?

6 "A The fixed number of men and horses in a  
7 division was about 70-80 per cent of the war-time  
8 strength and was far from being adequate. Since  
9 the autumn of 1943 the crack divisions were gradu-  
10 ally transferred to the south and only newly-formed  
11 divisions of inferior quality were left.

12 "Q What was the military strength of the  
13 Manchoukuo Army?

14 "A The Manchoukuo Army was increased from  
15 the former 80,000 to about 100,000 by virtue of the  
16 1945 plan, but it was difficult to increase further,  
17 as there was a serious shortage of arms."

18 I now call as a witness FUTAMI, Akishuro,  
19 whose testimony is contained in defense document  
20 1149.  
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FUTAMI

DIRECT

1 A K I S H U R O F U T A M I, called as a witness  
2 on behalf of the defense, being first duly  
3 sworn, testified through Japanese interpre-  
4 ters as follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

5  
6 BY MR. BLAKENEY:

7 Q Please state your name and residence.

8 A My address: Tokyo, Setagaya Matsubara  
9 3-1099. My name: FUTAMI, Akishuro.

10 MR. BLAKENEY: I ask that the witness be  
11 handed defense document 1,149.

12 (Whereupon, a document was handed to  
13 the witness.)

14 Q I ask you, Mr. Witness, to examine that  
15 and state whether it is your affidavit, bearing  
16 your signature and seal.

17 A It is my affidavit, and my signature and  
18 seal appears on it.

19 Q Are the contents thereof true and correct?

20 A Yes.

21 MR. BLAKENEY: The affidavit, defense  
22 document 1,149, is offered in evidence.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual  
24 terms.  
25

CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1,149

FUTAMI

DIRECT

1 will receive exhibit No. 2674.

2 (Whereupon, the document above refer-  
3 red to was marked defense exhibit 2674 and  
4 received in evidence.)

5 MR. BLAKENEY: I read the affidavit,  
6 which, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:

7 "I, FUTAMI, Akishuro, served at Rashin in  
8 Korea as the Commander of the Rashin Fortress, from  
9 December, 1942, to March, 1945. The units under  
10 me were the headquarters of the fortress and a  
11 heavy artillery regiment. The fortress was equipped  
12 with four 15-centimetre cannons and eight 7.5-centimetre  
13 cannons. We had no guns of larger calibre. The  
14 15-centimetre cannons were fixed batteries and the  
15 7.5 centimetre mobile field guns.

16 "About March, 1944, according to the order of  
17 the Imperial General Headquarters, the main strength  
18 of the artillery regiment was transferred to Japan  
19 proper, leaving about 100 men. The batteries were  
20 also removed then and only several 7.5 centimetre  
21 cannons remained in Rashin.

22 "The Keiko district was outside my jurisdic-  
23 tion, but there was no fortress in and around Keiko.  
24 There were only field combat positions."  
25

You may cross-examine.

FUTAMI

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THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, we refer the Tribunal to exhibit 727 and 718. The prosecution do not desire to cross-examine this witness.

MR. BLAKENEY: I ask that he be excused on the usual terms.

THE PRESIDENT: He is excused accordingly.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

MR. BLAKENEY: We now come, with the reservation of the testimony of General TANAKA and others not yet ready, to the questions of neutrality pacts and neutrality. We have already seen, from the testimony of Mr. OTA, exhibit 2659, that negotiations for a neutrality pact between Russia and Japan had been undertaken upon the initiative of Ambassador TOGO in 1939 or early 1940. The pact which finally resulted has been introduced into evidence, prosecution exhibit No. 45, and read into the record at page 17,239. The pact is of sufficient importance that I should like to be permitted to read again its very brief operative provisions.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no occasion to do that, Major.

MAJOR BLAKENEY: Then, I summarize the provisions by reminding the Tribunal that they require

1 maintenance of peaceful and friendly relations, mutual  
2 respect for territorial inviolability, and the main-  
3 tenance mutually of neutrality in the event of mili-  
4 tary action involving the parties.

5 That neither the Japanese Government nor the  
6 Japanese Army, including the Kwantung Army, ever had  
7 any intention other than faithfully to abide by the  
8 spirit of the Neutrality Pact will be shown by the  
9 evidence to follow. We have first the statement of  
10 Minister of War TOJO, on 28 June 1941, as recorded in  
11 prosecution exhibit 1098, an abstract from Marquis  
12 KIDO's diary entry of that date.

13 Inasmuch as the exhibit has been read, I call  
14 the attention of the Tribunal to lines 4 and 5 and  
15 the first half of line 6 thereof.

16 THE PRESIDENT: We will give you permission  
17 to read two and one-half lines.

18 MR. BLAKENEY: Which are as follows; that  
19 TOJO explained: "The Army's policy dealing with the  
20 German-Soviet War is that the attitude of the Kwantung  
21 Army towards that war should be calm and prudent."

22 Next I offer in evidence defense document  
23 No. 1145, the affidavit of Lieutenant General TANABE,  
24 Moritake.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1145  
2 will receive exhibit No. 2675.

3 (Whereupon, the document above  
4 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
5 No. 2675 and received in evidence.)

6 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

7 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, I apologize,  
8 but we expected that the witness will be called and  
9 will appear on the witness stand; and we object to  
10 the introduction of this affidavit now.

11 This witness is not an expert and his affi-  
12 davit contains nothing but unfounded statements,  
13 opinions, for which no grounds are given and for which  
14 there are no concrete facts. From our point of view,  
15 the document has no probative value at all.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

17 MR. BLAKENEY: I do not understand whether  
18 objection is being made because the witness is not  
19 produced as well as because, in the opinion of counsel,  
20 the affidavit has no probative value.

21 THE PRESIDENT: If the affidavit is not  
22 rejected, he wants the witness called.

23 MR. BLAKENEY: Well, I should like, first,  
24 to say a word on that point.

25 I want to say that it comes with singularly



1 ill grace from the prosecution to raise in the Russian  
2 phase the question of production of witnesses. In  
3 their Russian phase the prosecution introduced the  
4 affidavits of the seventeen witnesses, including four  
5 Soviet nationals and thirteen prisoners of war in their  
6 power, concerning whom objection was made and pro-  
7 duction for cross-examination insisted upon. It would  
8 serve no useful purpose again to mention them by name.  
9 It should be noted that three of those seventeen were  
10 announced to be dead at the time the affidavits were  
11 produced.

12 In addition, a half-hour's perusal of the  
13 index of the record, which, anticipating that this  
14 objection might be raised, I made last evening, dis-  
15 closes the following partial list of witnesses of  
16 various nationalities -- but all under the control of  
17 the prosecuting nations -- who testified by affidavit  
18 and not corporeally:

19 Seventy-six Americans, including one major  
20 general, one ambassador and one secretary of state, as  
21 well as a lieutenant colonel who testified that he was  
22 chief of the investigation of the Legal Section of  
23 SCAP in Tokyo.

24 Seventy-two Australians.

25 Fifty-six British, including two major

1       generals, one ambassador, and one under-secretary of  
2       state.

3               Fifteen Burmese.

4               Nineteen Chinese.

5               Sixty-nine Dutch, including one governor-  
6       general.

7               Thirty-three Filipinos; thirty-five French;  
8       thirty Indians; seven Indo-Chinese; twenty-six Indo-  
9       nesians; thirty-eight Japanese; one Korean; four Portu-  
10      guese; five Russians; three South Seas Islanders; one  
11      Swiss; or a total of 546 witnesses for this off-hand  
12      survey.

13              The attendance of General TANABE, whose  
14      affidavit is now under consideration for the giving  
15      of testimony on behalf of the defense, was requested  
16      November last. But by paper No. 602, the 25th of  
17      November, the Tribunal ordered that every facility  
18      and assistance be provided for the submission of  
19      written interrogatories for General TANABE at the  
20      place where he was located. The written interrogatories  
21      were submitted and defense document 1145 is the result.  
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1 THE PRESIDENT: If we admit the affidavit,  
2 and I do not see how we can reject it unless it  
3 amounts to swearing the issue, as it may, then the  
4 maximum right the prosecution have is to ask that  
5 the witness be called for cross-examination by them.  
6 If the document is admitted that application can be  
7 made and we will consider it, as we are considering  
8 other similar applications on behalf of the defense.

9 MR. BLANKENY: On the question of proba-  
10 tive value or whether the affidavit consists of  
11 conclusions, I point out that this man was Vice  
12 Chief of the General Staff, which means that he was  
13 the second man in the hierarchy of the Army  
14 Supreme Command. Certainly, then, he is a man who  
15 can state the intention of the Supreme Command. He  
16 can state what they made their principle and what  
17 they felt, which is what he undertakes to do.

18 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, the long  
19 argument made by my learned colleague went beyond  
20 the target, missed the target. If there were proper  
21 explanations of the absence of the witness, we would  
22 gladly have accepted the affidavit without calling  
23 the witness. I draw the attention of the Members  
24 of the Tribunal to the fact that the affidavit of  
25 TANABE, Moritake, doesn't comply with the

1 established rules, with the rules pertaining to  
2 affidavits which when drawn up must contain facts,  
3 concrete facts, which are known to the witness.  
4 All the statements made by the witness in the  
5 affidavit are mere assertions of the witness,  
6 groundless assertions of the witness, who is not  
7 an expert. Only on this ground have we objected  
8 to the introduction of this affidavit, which does  
9 not comply with the established rules.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Again you are a long time  
11 in making that objection. I hesitated for some  
12 minutes after Mr. Blakeney tendered that affidavit  
13 before I said it was admitted. Well, the first  
14 question is whether we will admit this affidavit.

15 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, the cause of  
16 our delay is that Mr. Blakeney did not notify us  
17 that he was not going to call the witness for cross-  
18 examination, and we expected the witness to be  
19 called.

20 MR. BLAKENEY: I don't quite know why the  
21 Soviet prosecutor should have expected that.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Is he on your order of proof?

23 MR. BLAKENEY: Yes.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Well, the third paragraph  
25 certainly appears objectionable, Major Blakeney.

1 MR. BLAKENEY: I should like to be heard  
2 on that if the Tribunal thinks so.

3 While it is true that the language may be  
4 inartistic, I should like to point out that there  
5 are two distinct, concrete statements of fact  
6 therein. That the Kwantung Army, under the command  
7 of its Commanding General, had complied with the  
8 intentions of the central army authorities, which  
9 intentions are mentioned in the preceding para-  
10 graph, and that the army authorities at Tokyo,  
11 of whom the man now speaking is one of the highest,  
12 had confidence in the General's leadership, having  
13 in mind the objectives mentioned above. I quite  
14 agree that the language of that paragraph is not  
15 the language which a lawyer would have used, but  
16 I must point out to the Tribunal that this man was  
17 held a prisoner of war by the Dutch in Medan,  
18 Sumatra, and no lawyer was able to go and see him and  
19 take his affidavit.

20 THE PRESIDENT: More objectionable, of  
21 course, is the statement that the Kwantung Army  
22 had always assumed a prudent and proper attitude  
23 against the USSR. That is purely an opinion to be  
24 derived from a consideration of the facts.

25 MR. BLAKENEY: I suggest to your Honor



1 that those words are defined by what precedes,  
2 that is, we made it our principle to do so and so,  
3 and we felt all the more the need to maintain a  
4 prudent attitude, referring back to that principle.

5 THE PRESIDENT: There are some statements of  
6 fact. "We made it our principle never to enter  
7 into a state of war against the USSR." That is  
8 one. "We felt all the more keenly the need of  
9 maintaining a prudent attitude towards the USSR."  
10 That is another. But the third paragraph is  
11 certainly objectionable.

12 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, you have  
13 on many occasions stated that the opinions expressed  
14 by the witness couldn't serve as evidence and  
15 pointed it out to the parties. I fully agree with  
16 your words, your Honor, that the third paragraph is  
17 highly objectionable, that in this paragraph the  
18 opinions of the witness are stated, and therefore  
19 it cannot be accepted in evidence. As far as the  
20 first two paragraphs of the affidavit are concerned,  
21 I withdraw my previous objection, taking into con-  
22 sideration the view expressed by your Honor.

23 THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is admitted  
24 except as to the third paragraph thereof.  
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1 MR. BLAKENEY: I shall read the first two  
2 paragraphs of the affidavit of Moritake TANABE.

3 (Reading:)

4 "I became Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff  
5 in November 1941. At that time, not only had The  
6 Supreme Command no intention whatsoever of engaging  
7 in any positive action against the USSR but on the  
8 contrary, Japan, being under constant threat of the  
9 Soviet's Far Eastern Army in those days, was devoting  
10 its utmost efforts to defensive measures. Circumstances  
11 being such, we had made it our principle never to enter  
12 into a state of war against the U.S.S.R.

13 "Especially after the outbreak of the Pacific  
14 War, we felt all the more keenly the need of maintain-  
15 ing a prudent attitude towards the U.S.S.R."

16 THE PRESIDENT: Well, the prosecution may  
17 apply, of course, to have this witness called for  
18 cross-examination. Unless he is cross-examined, his  
19 affidavit -- his evidence may be of no value. But  
20 the prosecution must decide whether they will apply,  
21 or not.  
22

23 MR. BLAKENEY: We shall, of course, be glad  
24 to join in such an application. We would still like  
25 to have the witness' attendance.

COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, earlier the

1 defense expressed the wish not to call the witness  
2 for cross-examination -- for examination, and we  
3 agreed to that wish of the defense, or to satisfy  
4 the wish of the defense. But that does not mean  
5 that we agree or accept the statements, the mere  
6 statements made by the witness in his affidavit  
7 which, in our opinion, are unfounded and groundless.  
8 We do not insist on calling this witness for examina-  
9 tion, but we ask you to take into consideration our  
10 remark.

11 MR. BLAKENEY: If counsel is stating, as  
12 I understood him to be, that the defense had in  
13 some way agreed to the non-production of this witness,  
14 he is stating as fact that which is not true. As  
15 to counsel's gratuitous remarks concerning his  
16 opinion of the ungrounded character of the evidence,  
17 I suggest that he be admonished to refrain from  
18 such remarks in the future. They amount to nothing  
19 more than unsworn testimony by counsel and they are  
20 grossly improper.

21 THE PRESIDENT: In such matters the Tribunal  
22 usually act on their own motion.

23 COLONEL IVANOV: Your Honor, I am highly  
24 surprised at the attitude taken by Mr. Blakeney in  
25 this question and the fact that the affidavit was

1 produced without production of the witness speaks  
2 for itself.

3 THE PRESIDENT: The debate is closed.

4 MR. BLAKENEY: If the Tribunal please, I  
5 will have to request indulgence for a moment to re-  
6 arrange my papers.

7 THE PRESIDENT: We will take the mid-  
8 afternoon recess now. We will recess for fifteen  
9 minutes.

10 (Whereupon, at 1440, a recess  
11 was taken until 1455, after which the  
12 proceedings were resumed as follows:)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

4 MR. BLAKENEY: If the Tribunal please, I  
5 am somewhat embarrassed how to proceed with any  
6 matter having any logical connection with what  
7 has preceded. Therefore, if I may take the liberty,  
8 I should like again to make this suggestion that if  
9 I may be permitted to read the direct testimony of  
10 the witness TANAKA, which, by the way, was served  
11 according to the receipt at 3:45 yesterday, that  
12 would be before the close of business, that will  
13 consume the rest of the day.

14 THE PRESIDENT: A Member of the Court  
15 said he was not served at the time prescribed by  
16 the rule.

17 MR. BLAKENEY: I am quite sure that is  
18 correct because, by reason of mechanical difficulties  
19 we were not able to get it out until yesterday. It  
20 was certainly not deliberate. I was suggesting that  
21 I think no one would be discommoded if cross-  
22 examination need not start until Monday.

23 THE PRESIDENT: We would like logical  
24 sequence to be preserved and we do not want to waste  
25 an hour in order to secure logical sequence.

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 General Vasiliev.

2 GENERAL VASILIEV: As far as the prosecution  
3 is concerned, we are ready to meet the wishes of the  
4 defense and we agree to hear the reading of the affi-  
5 davit now and to cross-examine on Monday.

6 THE PRESIDENT: That is very satisfactory.

7 MR. BLAKENEY: I ask that the witness TANAKA,  
8 Shinichi be recalled.

9

- - -

10 S H I N I C H I T A N A K A, recalled as a witness  
11 on behalf of the defense, having been previously  
12 sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters as  
13 follows:  
14

15 DIRECT EXAMINATION

16 BY MR. BLAKENEY:

17 Q Mr. Witness, please state your name and  
18 residence to the Tribunal.

19 THE PRESIDENT: You are still on your former  
20 oath.

21 A My name is TANAKA, Shinichi. My address:  
22 Mie Prefecture, Mie-gun, Mizusawa-Mura Yokoseko, No.  
23 2042.

24 MR. BLAKENEY: I ask that he be handed the  
25 affidavit, defense document 1323.

Q And I ask you, Mr. Witness, to examine this

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 document and state whether it is your affidavit  
2 bearing your signature and seal.

3 A This is my affidavit, and my signature and  
4 seal appears thereon.

5 Q Are the contents of the document true and  
6 correct?

7 A The affidavit is true and correct.

8 MR. BLAKENEY: I now offer in evidence the  
9 affidavit, defense document No. 1323.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1323  
12 will receive exhibit No. 2676.

13 (Whereupon, the document above  
14 referred to was marked defense exhibit 2676  
15 and received in evidence.)

16 MR. BLAKENEY: I read the affidavit which,  
17 omitting formal parts, is as follows:

18 "1. I, TANAKA Shinichi, am a former  
19 Lieutenant-General. My present residence is No. 2042,  
20 Mizusawa-Mura Yokoseko, Mie-gun, Mie Prefecture.

21 "2. I held the office of chief of the First  
22 Department (operations) in the General Staff Office  
23 from 12 October 1940 to 7 December 1942.

24 "3. The following is my deposition regarding  
25 operations plans against the Soviet Union and the



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 proposed expansion of armaments in Manchuria in 1941,  
2 in planning which I took part.

3 "4. In accordance with custom, the Army's  
4 plans for operations against the Russians for 1941  
5 were formed in the winter of 1940. They technically  
6 prescribed as the operations necessary for the de-  
7 fense of Japan Proper, Manchuria (in conformity with  
8 the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol which stipulated the  
9 joint defense duties), and Korea, and the basic prin-  
10 ciple of the plan consisted in shifting from a pro-  
11 tracted defensive to the offensive.

12 "I shall hereinafter furnish necessary  
13 data about this matter:

14 "(1) At the beginning of November 1941,  
15 General SUGIYAMA Gen, Chief of the General Staff  
16 (who took command of the General Staff Office as a  
17 whole and was responsible for national defense and  
18 tactics), indicated to the Vice-Chief (who conducted  
19 the general affairs of the office and was in charge of  
20 coordinating policy and operations) and myself, chief  
21 of the First Department (in charge of matters relating  
22 to operations), that in drawing up and deliberating  
23 on the plans of operations against Russia we should  
24 steadfastly adhere to the lines of national policy  
25 which had been established in regard to the adjustment

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations and to the  
2 policy which had been clearly shown to the Kwantung  
3 Army by the Supreme Command in August 1940; that is,  
4 the basic policy of reserving a part of the army to  
5 provide against Soviet attack and to maintain peace in  
6 the North. I was at the same time informed by the  
7 Chief of the General Staff that he and the War Minister  
8 had reached complete agreement on that fundamental  
9 principle.

10 "(2) The Second Department of the General  
11 Staff Office (whose duty it was to obtain intelligence  
12 and judge the situation, and whose chief was Lieuten-  
13 ant General TSUCHIHASHI Yuitsu until the beginning  
14 of 1941, later succeeded by Major General OKAMOTO  
15 Seifuku) came to the following conclusion regarding  
16 the situation at that time.

17 "In the winter of 1940-41 the Kwantung Army  
18 had 10 divisions and 500 planes as against 30 sharp-  
19 shooter divisions (according to information, the  
20 Russian forces stationed in the Far East, east of  
21 Baikal, reached 38 divisions, but I, for one, roughly  
22 estimate them at 30 divisions in this case) and 2,500  
23 planes which formed the main strength of the Soviet  
24 Army in the Far East. If the two Japanese divisions  
25 in Korea, and the four Russian divisions stationed in

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 the Siberian military district, were added respectively,  
2 Japan would have 12 divisions as against 34 sharp-  
3 shooter divisions of the Soviet Army. As a rule, the  
4 Soviet Army in the Far East had in the past aimed at  
5 maintenance of three times the strength of the Kwantung  
6 Army, but in those days the growing number of her  
7 planes and tanks tended to increase further the ratio  
8 of the Soviets' fighting power against Japan; and the  
9 Russian strength judged to be used in the Far East in  
10 wartime reached about 50 divisions.

11 "With the progress of her successive five-  
12 year plans, the Soviet preparation for mobilization,  
13 concentration and engagement upon the outbreak of a  
14 war remarkably increased the speed of its effectuation;  
15 it would, in our judgment, have been completed in three  
16 or four months at the latest. Japan had to take pre-  
17 cautions especially because the Russian Army stationed  
18 in the Far East had adopted even in peace time a high  
19 standard of quasi-wartime organization and more than  
20 100 long-range bombers stationed south of the Ussuri  
21 were in a position to raid Tokyo and other important  
22 areas in Japan Proper at any time, these being well  
23 within their bombing range. Out of the total mobilized  
24 strength of the Soviet Union, the sharpshooter divisions  
25 amounted to about 150, of which about 50 were on the

1 Far Eastern front. Therefore, even in the case of a  
2 two-front war, to say nothing of a single-front war  
3 in the Far East, it must be calculated that considerably  
4 more strength would be available for the Soviets in  
5 the Far East. Russia stood in a more advantageous  
6 position than Japan in regard also to the supply of  
7 strength after the commencement of operations. In  
8 addition to 4,500 first-line planes she had 2,000  
9 second-line planes which could be instantly used as  
10 first-line aircraft. Moreover, judging from the fact  
11 that in the Russo-Finnish war in the winter of 1939  
12 the Russian Army carried on operations maintaining a  
13 line of communications extending over 200 kilometres  
14 in 50 degrees below zero, and in view of the efficiency  
15 of the Russian supply at the time of the Nomonhan  
16 Incident, the capacity of the Soviet Army supply to  
17 assist the operations could by no means be made light of.

18 "(3) Next I will mention the direction of  
19 operations. The total wartime strength of the program  
20 for 1941 as approved by the War Ministry consisted of  
21 48 divisions and if its employment in wartime is es-  
22 timated at about 30 divisions against Russia, about 10  
23 in China operations, about five against Anglo-Americans  
24 and a few as reserve under the Imperial Headquarters,  
25 it was evident that a considerable shortage of strength

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

23,308

1 would be felt in every quarter, especially in regard  
2 to aircraft, tanks, rear services and liquid fuel.  
3 In particular, with only about 30 wartime divisions,  
4 it would be extremely difficult for us to take the  
5 offensive and overcome the Soviet Far Eastern Army on  
6 a wartime footing, which it was judged would reach  
7 about 50 divisions at the commencement of operations.  
8 After consultations and investigations with the War  
9 Ministry bureaus concerned in regard to the relative  
10 rapidity of concentrating mobilized forces and the  
11 relative capacity for production and supply of war  
12 materials of Japan and Russia, it was concluded that  
13 we were in a more difficult position to take such an  
14 initiative in these respects.

15 "Moreover, if our relations with the United  
16 States and Britain should grow strained, we should  
17 have to estimate at the least more than 10 divisions  
18 against these Powers, about 10 for China operations,  
19 more than 20 against Russia and a few for reserve under  
20 the Imperial Headquarters. In such case, it was feared,  
21 there would be little hope for Japan of even succeeding  
22 with defensive strategy to carry on a protracted defen-  
23 sive struggle. And the strategical danger from the  
24 above-mentioned wide disparity in numerical strength  
25 and war materials between Japan and Russia was



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 aggravated by the fact that even a basic defensive  
2 organization against the Soviets had not been estab-  
3 lished owing to the insufficient peacetime strength  
4 of the Kwantung Army at that time. The aforesaid  
5 circumstances also suggested that even if Japan could  
6 carry out her operations most favorably, she would come  
7 to a standstill strategically and would be at a loss  
8 how to discover the means to end the war.



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

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8 how to discover the means to end the war.

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TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 "The above was the result of investigations made  
2 by the First Department.

3 "Regarding the fact that Japan lagged far behind  
4 Russia in preparations for defensive operations on the  
5 Russo-Manchurian borders, General SUGIYAMA, who had  
6 inspected Manchuria in the autumn of 1940 immediately  
7 before his assumption of office as Chief of the Gen-  
8 eral Staff, reported as follows: Even on the eastern  
9 borders (Tungning and Suifenho) to which the Kwantung  
10 Army attached the greatest importance, the strength of  
11 divisional units was so weak that only about 60 soldiers  
12 out of an infantry company were available for emergency  
13 dispatch, to say nothing of the shortage of divisions  
14 themselves. Moreover, though the fortifications on the  
15 eastern borders had been somehow completed in the  
16 front, on the first line, there was no provision of  
17 tactical depth, on the second and third lines. Should  
18 an emergency arise, those lines would be easily broken  
19 through. The division commanders in charge of defense  
20 on the spot said that in the early stages of operations  
21 it would be very difficult to resist Russian attacks for  
22 three months, and quite impossible to do so for over  
23 four months. Many defects were to be seen, especially  
24 in the air force, he concluded.

25 "(4) The Chief of the General Staff approved

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 the results of the aforesaid investigations and con-  
2 cluded that Japan's policy of totally avoiding war  
3 should be adhered to from a standpoint of strategy as  
4 well; because, should a Russo-Japanese war break out, her  
5 shortage of fighting power as mentioned above not only  
6 would endanger the execution of operations but also  
7 would force Japan to leave the China Incident without  
8 any solution; and further if unfortunately the United  
9 States and Britain should become involved in the war,  
10 there would be little or no hope of success on the part  
11 of Japan, particularly in regard to air forces. He  
12 decided, therefore, that Japan should always adhere to  
13 her principle of totally avoiding war from a stand-  
14 point of strategy. I thought that on this point he was  
15 in complete agreement with the War Minister.  
16

17       "(5) Now I will discuss Japanese strategy,  
18 which was based on shifting from a delaying type of  
19 defense to the offense. I approved the conclusion of  
20 the First Section that the Kwantung Army--whose ground  
21 forces in wartime would not be more, at the most, than  
22 60 to 70 per cent of the Russian forces which would  
23 be used in wartime--would be obliged to employ defensive  
24 strategy at least in the early period of operations.  
25 The details of this were as follows: Their troop-strength

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 relationship with ours was as above mentioned. The  
2 relationship of concentration and transportation of  
3 forces and materials in the event of opening of hos-  
4 tilities would compel Japan definitely to adopt a de-  
5 fensive strategy in the early period of operations; that  
6 is, in order to secure a troop strength of about 30  
7 wartime divisions against Russia, she would be required  
8 to transport about 20 wartime divisions from Japan  
9 Proper and China to reinforce the 10 divisions stationed  
10 in Manchuria; the forces to be drawn from China and  
11 transferred to Manchuria were then actually engaged in  
12 the midst of China operations. In other words, about  
13 70 per cent of the Japanese total wartime strength  
14 against Russia and wartime materiel would require rapid  
15 increase and transportation, and assuming that circum-  
16 stances took the most favorable turn for Japan, and that  
17 railway and shipping throughout Japan Proper, Korea  
18 and Manchuria went most orderly and smoothly, it would  
19 take about 140 days from the time of mobilization to  
20 complete the concentration of the whole strength of the  
21 Kwantung Army. In the meanwhile, even if we hurried  
22 it would take 120 days after mobilization at the earliest  
23 to change to the offensive and commence it in the  
24 eastern border area (Tungning and Suifenhö), and we  
25 reached the indisputable conclusion that the Russian

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 Army would take the initiative in starting the offensive  
2 during this period in view of general strategy and  
3 progress of Soviet preparations for operations. The  
4 Kwantung Army, therefore, was obliged to make it the  
5 basis of its operational plans that it should adopt  
6 a passive strategy at the beginning, check Russian  
7 aggressive attacks for quite a long time by a delaying  
8 type of defense, making every effort to speed prepara-  
9 tions for battle and overcome all obstacles during that  
10 time, and shift to the offense in the eastern border  
11 area first about the fifth month after the outbreak of  
12 war. We reached the above conclusion.

13 "Regarding the decision on the time for assuming  
14 the offensive, we did not take into consideration much  
15 of the practical claims by the Kwantung Army that at  
16 least one month or generally two months for preparation  
17 for battle after the concentration of forces would be  
18 necessary for the eastern border operations. Concerning  
19 the above, according to the judgment of the Second Sec-  
20 tion, it would obviously take a longer time for the  
21 Kwantung Army to complete preparations for commencement  
22 of attack, if we took into account the extremely well-  
23 developed intelligence net of the Soviet Union, the  
24 real conditions of peace in Manchuria and the existence  
25 of the well-equipped and superior Russian air forces



1 which could freely destroy our transportation. In addi-  
2 tion, the Russian forces stationed in the Far East not  
3 only retained a high standard of quasi-wartime organ-  
4 ization in ordinary times, but were far superior to  
5 the Japanese in their speed of concentrating mobilized  
6 forces. In other words, from the aforesaid various  
7 circumstances, it was clearly indicated that Japan would  
8 surely face a prepared Russian-initiated attack with  
9 her operations unprepared, irrespective of whether it was  
10 to the east (Tungning and Suifenhö), the north (Heiho)  
11 or the west (Hailar and the Great Hsingan Mountains).  
12 We had especially to pay serious attention to the  
13 inevitability and intenseness of early air-raids on  
14 Japan Proper and Manchuria by Russian planes. In short,  
15 we reached the conclusion that it would evidently take  
16 a much longer time than the planned estimate to con-  
17 centrate and transport Japanese forces to the Kwantung  
18 Army in wartime, and that the period of this concen-  
19 tration and transportation would constitute one of  
20 grave crisis in operations against Russia.

21 "(6) According to the investigations by the  
22 First Section, the Kwantung Army should shift to the  
23 offensive following the delaying type of defense in the  
24 early period of the hostilities and should, especially  
25 in the eastern border area, at least sweep and destroy



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 the bases of long-range bombers in the southern Maritime  
2 Province of Siberia, in order to complete the defense  
3 of Japan. This was a minimum requirement from the  
4 viewpoint of defense, which is why the Japanese Army  
5 must take the offensive, without falling into a mere  
6 defense which would compel it to stay on the borders  
7 for a long time. With the development of the war situa-  
8 tion thereafter, she should open an offensive movement  
9 on other borders between Manchuria and Russia to complete  
10 her defense and positively carry out operations nec-  
11 essary for the termination of the war.

12 "(7) Now I shall discuss operations in the  
13 north--Blagoveshchensk--as viewed by the First Section.

14 "In the eastern border area, the offensive  
15 operations would require about two months after changing  
16 over to the attack, it was considered. During that  
17 time the Japanese forces would check the Russian attack  
18 and invasion in the north (Peiho), while in the west  
19 (Hailar) they would withdraw, if necessary, successively  
20 to the line of the Great Hsingan Mountains to obtain  
21 sufficient time. Along with the completion of organiza-  
22 tion of a passive offensive in the east, attack would be  
23 opened anew and changed over to the northern area of  
24 Blagoveshchensk. For this purpose a strength of about  
25 10 divisions of ground forces and the main strength of

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

23,316

1 the air forces must be transferred from the eastern  
2 front to the northern one after the seventh or eighth  
3 month after the opening of hostilities. According to  
4 the investigations in cooperation with the Third Sec-  
5 tion (which dealt with transportation and communications  
6 and whose chief was Lieutenant General SUZUKI Sosaku),  
7 the transfer of Japanese forces to the north would require  
8 about three months even under the most favorable condi-  
9 tions. It became clear, therefore, that the concen-  
10 tration of forces for an attack in the north would  
11 figure out to continue at least until the end of the  
12 tenth or eleventh month after mobilization; needless  
13 to say, however, success and completion of the con-  
14 centration would be greatly influenced by the general  
15 war situation and extent of Russian air-raids. By far  
16 the most important problem was that of preparing muni-  
17 tions necessary for the attack in the north. According  
18 to consultations over the matter with the War Ministry  
19 about August 1941, the program was to prepare and store  
20 the ammunition necessary for two battles (eight months  
21 each) in Manchuria, but it was considered that it  
22 would be exhausted by the seventh month after mobiliza-  
23 tion when the battle in the eastern border area occurred.  
24 Therefore, the ammunition necessary for transition to  
25 the attack in the north must depend upon new production

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 after the outbreak of hostilities. The preparation of  
2 ammunition necessary for a total of 60 divisions,  
3 namely that for two battles for about 20 divisions in  
4 both the north and the west, and those for one battle  
5 for other forces of the Kwantung Army, would require  
6 seventeen months after mobilization, even if extreme  
7 economy in the amount of preparation were practiced.  
8 That is, the opening of attack on the northern front  
9 would be decisively curbed by this fact, and considera-  
10 tion of production and supply of ordnance other than  
11 ammunition would all the more be a circumstance requir-  
12 ing Japan's postponing the attack.

13 "In short, in the northern area of Peiho, Japan  
14 would face a Russian-initiated attack from the beginning  
15 of hostilities, and would not take the offensive until  
16 at the least more than a year had passed. During this  
17 time, there would be many changes occurring in the situa-  
18 tion. The conclusion was that realization of shifting  
19 to the attack in the north was very doubtful.

20  
21 "(8) The chief and vice-chief of the General  
22 Staff approved the aforesaid conditions and ordered  
23 that they form the basis of annual operations plans.  
24 We were asked to investigate in the future a policy of  
25 speeding up the time of shifting to the attack in the  
eastern area and at the same time to pay close attention

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 to not weakening the aggressive spirit of the Kwantung  
2 Army's officers and soldiers in the early part of the  
3 delaying type of defense operations. The Chief of  
4 Staff further asked that formulation of all plans should  
5 be based on the fact that Russo-Japanese operations  
6 in the Far East might be considered overseas ones to  
7 Russia, and could be compared to colonial operations;  
8 but to us they were interior operations, a battle around  
9 the area of our very heart. According to his own inspec-  
10 tions in Manchuria, however, defensive preparations  
11 at the actual spot were a matter of serious anxiety  
12 and required the strengthening of the defense and guard  
13 organization of the Kwantung Army in ordinary times.  
14 For this purpose, he indicated firstly that the system  
15 of 16 divisions being stationed in Manchuria and Korea  
16 must be realized. This system, of course, had to have  
17 the consent of the War Ministry; and the Ministry itself  
18 had, furthermore, to get the Government's consent to  
19 the outline of materials and expenditure, among other  
20 things. It having, further, connections with diplomacy,  
21 we were asked to continue investigations on its realiza-  
22 tion thereafter.

24 "(9) In the formation of operational plans for  
25 1941, the existence of the Tripartite Pact among Japan,  
Germany and Italy had no influence whatsoever. The

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 Chief of Staff and the Vice-Chief clarified, in this  
2 connection, the view that the Tripartite Pact neither  
3 contributed to nor influenced the operations plans of  
4 1941 against Russia; and therefore, if a Russo-Japanese  
5 war broke out Japan would never expect operational  
6 assistance from Germany and Italy, and similarly Japan  
7 did not feel obligated to help Germany and Italy in case  
8 of war between Russia and those two countries.

9  
10 "At that time, further, no one even dreamed  
11 of the likelihood of a Russo-German war's breaking out.

12 "(10) At this time the Second Section of the  
13 General Staff had the following opinion on the general  
14 situation concerning Russia beside the aforesaid ones  
15 on operational situations; namely, immediately after  
16 the outbreak of the China Incident, that is, in August  
17 1937, the Russo-Chinese non-aggression pact was concluded;  
18 It is not clear whether a military treaty was attached  
19 to it, but in 1939 there was a Russo-Chinese secret  
20 agreement. Further, a Russo-Chinese trade pact was  
21 concluded, the chief aim of which was to supply China  
22 with arms. Again, in March 1939, following Stalin's  
23 address at the Moscow Communists mass meeting in which  
24 he showed his support of China, Molotov's policy of  
25 assisting China was confirmed. Taking into considera-  
tion this series of facts, the principle of two-front



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 operations in both east and west which was established  
2 in 1935, the five-year plans which included industriali-  
3 zation and militarization of the Far East, the Russian  
4 attitude toward the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tri-  
5 partite Pact, it was concluded that Russia would resort  
6 in future to interference with Japan.

7 "5. Regarding the outbreak of the Russo-German  
8 war, I state the following.  
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1           "(1) The Chief and the Vice-Chief of the  
2 General Staff gave to the Department Chiefs under  
3 their jurisdiction immediately after the decision  
4 on the national policy, the following explanations  
5 of Japan's relations with the USSR.

6           "Such will be the most favorable situation  
7 for Japan as it will rectify the USSR's character  
8 menacing the Far East, prevent Germany from muster-  
9 ing power to threaten the Far East and, further,  
10 realize cooperation among Japan, German and the  
11 USSR. Resort to arms is aimed at the settling of  
12 the northern problem; if the northern problem could  
13 be settled by such diplomatic means with armed force  
14 in the background, it would be more desirable. In  
15 any case, the long-term and protracted use of arms  
16 must be strictly decided; that is to say, the idea  
17 of the use of arms pre-supposes the evasion of a  
18 large-scale operations in a concrete form. There-  
19 fore, in this case, military preparation against the  
20 USSR is not synonymous with preparations for war.  
21 And resort to arms is not yet decided upon at this  
22 time.

23           "The problems of Japan's northern defense,  
24 Sakhalin and the rights in northern waters, will be  
25 rationally solved. It is hoped that ultimately by

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the  
2 border regions of Manchuria and Russia, border dis-  
3 putes will end, the Sakhalin and fisheries problems  
4 will be solved and Japan freed from menace. Even  
5 though a German-Soviet war may break out, the exis-  
6 tence of the Tripartite Pact, needless to say, does  
7 not obligate Japan to render aid to German operations  
8 and our actions are not restricted by it. This nation-  
9 al policy was not the deciding factor for the use of  
10 arms against the USSR; it only stipulated that the  
11 required research or preparation must be made in  
12 view of the possible necessity for the use of arms  
13 in accordance with future developments. As to whether  
14 we shall resort to arms, we have made no commitments  
15 to Germany.

16 "In the hastening of preparations for a  
17 possible war with America and Great Britain and the  
18 policy to be adopted vis-a-vis Soviet Russia, the  
19 elimination of possible obstacles to the maintenance  
20 of the basic policy towards America and Great Britain  
21 was a great restraining influence in the drawing up  
22 of measures vis-a-vis Soviet Russia. Among the above  
23 matters, the question concerning the use of arms was  
24 regarded as the most important and an order was issued  
25 to the vice-chief, the department chiefs and the head

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

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1 of the 20th office requiring the careful examination  
2 thereof.

3 "(2) To sum up the judgments of the second  
4 part, which covers the period from the German-Soviet  
5 war to about the end of July 1941, they are as follows:

6 "The development of the German-Soviet was  
7 cannot be so easily predicted. But there is no little  
8 fear of the protraction of the war. The report of  
9 Ambassador TATEKAWA to the Foreign Ministry author-  
10 ities, and that of the military attaches in the  
11 USSR contain the same opinion. The German declar-  
12 ation as to the end of the war needs careful consider-  
13 ation. Though the transportation to European Russia  
14 of the Soviet forces stationed in the Far East will  
15 naturally take place, Soviet abandonment of the Far  
16 East is certainly inconceivable. This will restrict  
17 the extent of the transportation of the Far Eastern  
18 forces to the west and will not allow of the cutting  
19 of the actual strength by half. If it should be  
20 halved, 15 sharpshooter divisions would be left in  
21 the area east of Lake Baikal and the hasty use of  
22 arms against them would inevitably result in an un-  
23 expected emergency. Therefore in order to settle  
24 the northern problem it is necessary to concentrate  
25 sufficient forces in Manchuria. That which requires

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

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22 arms against them would inevitably result in an un-  
23 expected emergency. Therefore in order to settle  
24 the northern problem it is necessary to concentrate  
25 sufficient forces in Manchuria. That which requires

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 particular consideration is a possible conflict be-  
2 tween Japan and the Anglo-American camp in view of  
3 the growing difficulties of the negotiations between  
4 Japan and America since the outbreak of the Russo-  
5 German war. Also, the Soviet attitude toward Japan  
6 must be strictly watched, since the USSR, which has  
7 long been menacing Japan, was entered into a state  
8 of hostilities with Germany, one of our allies. The  
9 would-be closer rapprochement between the United  
10 States, Britain and the USSR in the Far East may  
11 give impetus to US-Soviet military cooperation and  
12 especially to the advance of American air forces  
13 into the Far East.

14 "Furthermore, when we take into consider-  
15 ation the confusion in the Soviet territory and the  
16 lack of peace and order in Manchuria caused by the  
17 German-Soviet war, it is necessary that we should  
18 strengthen the defense, vigilance and war-prepar-  
19 ations in Manchuria as a measure of self-defence  
20 regardless of whether we have the intention of  
21 settling the northern problem.

22 "In addition, the change in Japan's re-  
23 lation with the United States, especially in view  
24 of the difficulties in the negotiations between the  
25 two countries since the outbreak of the German-Soviet



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 war and the attendant change in future relations is,  
2 along with the state of affairs in the USSR, the  
3 most important item to be considered in deciding  
4 Japan's defence policy against the USSR. According  
5 to the judgment of the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow,  
6 Lieutenant-General TATEKAWA, in connection with the  
7 prospect of the German-Soviet war, the USSR will not  
8 yield to Germany. Such a thing as a compromise is  
9 inconceivable. The war will be protracted. Commu-  
10 nism is vehement nationalism and patriotism. The  
11 USSR will not totter. There is apprehension that  
12 the USSR may take positive steps in the Far Eastern  
13 area in case she should be strongly supported by the  
14 United States and Britain.

15 "Then, the relations between Japan and the  
16 United States took a sudden turn for the worse with  
17 the American-British freezing of Japanese assets  
18 upon Japanese-French agreement for joint defense  
19 of French Indo-China. Therefore it was judged, most  
20 serious consideration would be required as to what  
21 should be the measures for settling the northern  
22 problem in view of the situation as of about the  
23 end of July 1941.

24 "(3) At the beginning of July 1941 the  
25 Chief of the General Staff intended to dispatch

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 more troops to Manchuria in view of the circumstances,  
2 after he had compared the actual strength of the  
3 Soviet Army with that of the Kwantung Army and made  
4 a judgment of the future moves of the Soviet Army,  
5 taking into consideration our relations with the  
6 United States and Britain. And then, after consul-  
7 tation with the War Ministry, reinforcement by two  
8 divisions, as the nucleus, was decided upon in early  
9 July.

10 "But the agreement reached between the War  
11 Ministry and the General Staff was as follows. In  
12 view of the general situation, including Japanese-  
13 American relations, and especially the smallness of  
14 the reinforcements for Manchuria, it seemed more  
15 urgent to reserve the hope of military preparation  
16 for settling the northern problem and to streamline  
17 the 16-division system in Manchuria and Korea with  
18 the long-pending object of defence and vigilance.  
19 And in case the opportunity became ripe in future  
20 for settling the northern problem, this would have  
21 significance also as the preliminary steps thereto.  
22 "That resulted from this was the reinforcement of  
23 the army in Manchuria, or the so-called Kwantung  
24 Army Special Maneuver. But it was the desire of the  
25 War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff to

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 drive home to the officers and men, on the occasion  
2 of this reinforcement, the idea that it did not mean  
3 the commencement of military operations. Frontier  
4 incidents were also to be avoided by them.

5 "(4) Since the end of July 1941 we started  
6 a study of a plan of operations against the USSR  
7 which was different from that of 1941. The study of  
8 the new plan of operations against the USSR which  
9 would fit the situation was necessitated by the  
10 declaration on 2 July 1941 of a national policy of  
11 preparedness for war with the United States and  
12 Britain, if unavoidable. But in consideration of  
13 the foregoing paragraph (2), and the changes of the  
14 trends of the times, which required serious consider-  
15 ation of our relations with the United States, the  
16 Chief of the General Staff again ordered the vice-  
17 chief and the 1st Division Chief to study the new  
18 operation plan against the USSR, as well as the  
19 operations plans against Britain and America which  
20 were correlated with the former. It was because the  
21 Chief of the General Staff came to consider that if  
22 operations against the United States and Britain  
23 should be taken into consideration at all, a con-  
24 siderable increase, contradictory to the annual  
25 operations plan, in the strength available for the

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 defence against the USSR was unavoidable, that is  
2 to say, we could not help reducing the general scope  
3 of the defence operations against the USSR to some  
4 20 divisions. Nevertheless, the policy remained  
5 unchanged as to the principle that the operations  
6 would be based upon self-defence for insuring the  
7 defence of the Japanese mainland by a strategy of  
8 protracted defensive and passive offensive. The  
9 results of the studies were approximately as  
10 follows: Strict vigilance would be maintained re-  
11 lying on the existing strength, defence would be  
12 further reinforced and utmost efforts would be made  
13 to prevent war from breaking out. In case the USSR  
14 should challenge us, we would lose no time in dis-  
15 patching necessary reinforcements, destroying in  
16 an instant the enemy air forces in the Soviet Far  
17 East in order rapidly to destroy the enemy air force  
18 in the southern part of the Maritime Province and  
19 thus insure our defence. Time elapsed while the  
20 General Staff members were still studying those plans.

21 "6. I now discuss the reinforcement of the  
22 army in Manchuria in 1941, the so-called Kwantung  
23 Army Special Maneuver.

24 "(1) The reinforcement of the Kwantung  
25 Army in the summer of 1941, or the so-called Kwantung

1 Army Special Maneuver was intended to complete  
2 the 16-division system in Manchuria and Korea in  
3 line with the former study. Both the War Ministry  
4 and the General Staff were of the opinion that this  
5 step purported to rectify and strengthen the Kwan-  
6 tung Army's defence and guard system which had form-  
7 erly many defects and drawbacks and implied prelim-  
8 inary measures, to be adopted in case the national  
9 policy of 2 July be developed in future. This was  
10 one of the steps decided upon through the agreement  
11 between the War Ministry and the General Staff, with  
12 subsequent approval of the government, with a view  
13 to contributing to the execution of the peace-time  
14 duties of the Kwantung Army.

15 "(2) The Kwantung Army's peace-time duty  
16 is to defend Manchoukuo and Kwantung Province. But  
17 apart from that, in 1939 the central Supreme Command  
18 decided to assign a part of the Imperial Army for  
19 maintaining peace in the north as against the USSR,  
20 thus establishing the principle concerning the duties  
21 and actions of the Kwantung Army. Then, in July of  
22 1941, on the occasion of the so-called Kwantung Army  
23 Special Maneuver, the Imperial Headquarters gave an  
24 instruction to the commander of the Kwantung Army  
25 to the effect that the purpose of reinforcement,



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers, was  
2 to strengthen preparedness against the USSR.

3 "(3) The main strength of the Kwantung  
4 Army at that time consisted of 10 divisions (in  
5 addition, two divisions not completely organized  
6 and of meager strength) and 500 airplanes. It was,  
7 according to the judgment of the 2nd department (of  
8 the General Staff), not much more than 30 per cent  
9 of the Soviet forces actually existing in the Far  
10 East. In these circumstances, unless the 16-divi-  
11 sion system in Manchuria and Korea, the minimum re-  
12 quirement for defensive preparedness, materialized,  
13 peace in the north could never be maintained, accord-  
14 ing to the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff,  
15 General SUGIYAMA.

16 "(4) The main features of the so-called  
17 Kwantung Army Special Maneuver included reinforce-  
18 ment of the divisions stationed in Manchuria, dis-  
19 patch of two divisions (one of which was diverted  
20 to South China in September); additional dispatch of  
21 forces under the direct control of the Kwantung Army  
22 such as air forces and artillery, additional dispatch  
23 of supply forces such as automobile and transport  
24 units, organization of the Kwantung Defence Head-  
25 quarters to command all independent garrisons exist-

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 ing in Manchuria, establishment of the 20th Army  
2 Corps Headquarters, and increased supply of munitions.  
3 Also such matters required from the above items as  
4 mobilization of men, collection of materials, organ-  
5 ization and equipment of the forces, transportation  
6 of men and materials, training, disposition and  
7 billeting of the forces were dealt with. For the  
8 mobilization of the required men the form of emerg-  
9 ency enlistment was adopted and each unit was  
10 placed on the basis of full equipment, but not on  
11 the wartime basis. The above-mentioned constituted  
12 the substance of the so-called Kwantung Army Special  
13 Maneuver and did not imply a war program, operational  
14 plans or strategic plans.

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TANAKA, S

DIRECT

1           "(5) Its execution covered the period from  
2       July to October 1941. As the result, the Kwantung Army's  
3       strength at the end of 1941 consisted of 13 divisions  
4       (in addition to the 10 divisions which had existed in  
5       Manchuria prior to the maneuver, two were dispatched  
6       from Japan proper and two others were organized in Man-  
7       churia, in line with the formerly established program;  
8       but use of them was diverted to South China) and other  
9       units, so the total strength of the Kwantung Army in  
10      Manchuria was a little over--"

11           I am sorry. It is illegible here.

12           THE PRESIDENT: It looks like 100,000.

13           MR. BLAKENEY: I think it is 600,000, but I  
14      will have to look it up in the Japanese original. I  
15      will have them look that up.

16           "Among them the air forces had some 700 ser-  
17      viceable planes after the Kwantung Army Special maneuver,  
18      but since many of them were transferred, 280 serviceable  
19      planes remained at the end of 1941. The above-mentioned  
20      Kwantung Army strength contains not only the increase by  
21      the so-called Kwantung Army Special maneuver program,  
22      but also that realized in 1941 by the previously esta-  
23      blished program unrelated to the former. For example,  
24      the aforesaid organization of two divisions in Manchuria  
25      belongs to the previously established program.

TANAKA, S

DIRECT

1           "(6) The Kwantung Army Special Maneuver was  
2 placed under the routine control of the Vice-Chief of  
3 the General Staff, in line with the Chief's direction,  
4 after having been decided at a conference between the  
5 General Staff and the War Ministry. But the steps for  
6 each question were decided and disposed of each time  
7 without waiting for the over-all plan of execution.

8           "(7) Even after the Kwantung Army Special  
9 Maneuver had been carried out, the Kwantung Army's  
10 defensive and guard preparedness along the Soviet-  
11 Manchurian frontiers was weak, and it was greatly  
12 feared at that time whether Japan's defensive opera-  
13 tions could possibly be conducted, as was provided in  
14 the operational plan on the basis of 15 divisions in  
15 Manchuria and Korea, in case of a Soviet attack.  
16 Around November 1941, when a part of the Soviet Far  
17 Eastern Army was transferred to the European zone, its  
18 strength consisted of 22 sharpshooter divisions, about  
19 four other divisions, and some 1500 airplanes and 1300  
20 tanks, while the Kwantung Army was estimated as inferior  
21 by about 50 per cent to the former, even after the re-  
22 inforcement by the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver."

23           I am told that the missed figure in paragraph  
24 5 was found to be 600,00 on the original.  
25

"At about the beginning or the middle of August

1 1941 the said department of the General Staff estimated  
2 the situation as follows: The Soviet-Manchurian frontier  
3 districts would likely be considerably stabilized, and  
4 there would be no sign of materialization of military  
5 cooperation in the Far East between the United States  
6 and the U.S.S.R. Judging from the general situation,  
7 the Soviet Army would not challenge Japan for the time  
8 being; that is to say, seeing as we maintained this de-  
9 gree of strength based on the re-inforced strength by  
10 the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers.)

11 "At about the beginning or in the middle of  
12 August, the Chief of the General Staff approved the  
13 aforesaid estimate of the situation and acknowledged  
14 that there would be very little chance of the Soviet  
15 Army's taking a defiant attitude for the time being, if  
16 the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver were perfectly carried  
17 out. The War Minister also gave consent to it. And  
18 after a consultation it was decided not to slacken the  
19 Kwantung Army's alertness and preparedness and to spur  
20 the execution of the established plan of the Kwantung  
21 Army Special Maneuver as much as possible, making pre-  
22 paration for the approaching winter. Then the surveil-  
23 lance of the execution of the established plan for main-  
24 taining peace in the north was further tightened in order  
25 to avoid untoward incidents on the Soviet-Manchurian



1 frontiers, and efforts were exerted for defense and  
2 self-protection, taking utmost precaution not to arouse  
3 friction, and adhering to a policy of peace at any cost.

4 "The established plan for peace in the north in-  
5 cluded such steps as suitably withdrawing the outposts  
6 in those districts where troubles were likely to start,  
7 while strictly forbidding the forces to advance, to dis-  
8 pense with defense duties in those areas where frontiers  
9 were disputed or the actions of forces were difficult,  
10 and to do the most possible in localizing frontier  
11 troubles in case they should arise.

12 "Thus efforts were made to maintain the peace  
13 in the north. While the materialization of the re-  
14 inforcement was being delayed day by day owing to the  
15 circumstances of shortage of transportation, the ap-  
16 proaching cold season in the Manchurian area finally  
17 necessitated abandonment of a part of the plan. Later,  
18 the unsatisfactory progress of the negotiations with the  
19 United States and Britain worsened the situation, and  
20 with the establishment of the new national policy in the  
21 beginning of September, a considerable proportion of the  
22 strength in Manchuria was withdrawn and diverted to South  
23 China, Formosa and northern French Indo-China.

24 "The chief forces diverted were one division  
25 and a considerable proportion of tanks, heavy artillery,

TANAKA, S

DIRECT

1 anti-aircraft guns, auxiliary forces, air corps head-  
2 quarters, fighters, and light and heavy bombers.

3 "I have stated as above the substance and cir-  
4 cumstances of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Ma-  
5 neuver, and I believe that I have made it clear that  
6 that plan was not meant to be a preparation for aggres-  
7 sion on the part of Japan against the U.S.S.R.

8 "7. In connection with developments there-  
9 after, I will now offer material to explain the Japanese  
10 attitude toward the Soviet Union.

11 "(1) Since the main emphasis of our national  
12 policy had naturally come to be directed toward the  
13 United States and Britian, according to the decision  
14 of 6 September, it followed that we not only clung to  
15 the established policy of peace toward the Soviet Union,  
16 but also reduced our precautions and war preparations  
17 against the Soviet Union. I have already referred to  
18 the major transfers from Manchuria to Southern China,  
19 Formosa and Northern French Indo-China, which took place  
20 between September and November of the year 1941. To  
21 explain in detail, the following units were transferred:

22 "1 division

23 "3 tank regiments

24 "5 heavy artillery regiments

25 "20-odd anti-aircraft artillery companies

TANAKA, S

DIRECT

1 "3 air brigade headquarters  
2 "4 fighter regiments  
3 "3 light bomber regiments  
4 "2 heavy bomber regiments  
5 "5 scout-plane squadrons and some ground  
6 service units.

7 "(2) After July 1941 the Japanese Army  
8 operating in China was planning, firstly, the Changsha  
9 operations, to be executed about September and October  
10 of the same year; secondly, operations for the restor-  
11 ation of peace and order in the triangular area com-  
12 prising Nanking, Shanghai and Hangchow; and thirdly,  
13 operations for aerial advance into the interior of  
14 China. Those constitute some of the factors to help  
15 judge the attitude of Japan toward the Soviet Union.

16 "(3) At the Liaison Conference held toward  
17 the middle of November 1941, the following decisions  
18 were reached: that in the event of the outbreak of a  
19 war against the United States and Britian, we should by  
20 all means avoid making enemies of other countries, and  
21 especially entering into a state of war against the  
22 Soviet Union; and that we would endeavor to effect a  
23 reconciliation between Germany and the Soviet Union,  
24 should they be so disposed, and winning the Soviet Union  
25 over to the Axis camp, adjust relations between Japan  
and the Soviet Union. This also helps to form an

TAKANA, S

DIRECT

1 opinion concerning Japan's attitude toward the Soviet  
2 Union.

3 "8. I now come to materials to explain the  
4 Japanese attitude toward the Soviet Union after the  
5 outbreak of the war against the United States and  
6 Britian.

7 "(1) The gist of the order issued by the Im-  
8 perial Headquarters to the Commander-in-Chief of the  
9 Kwantung Army on 3 December 1941, was as follows:

10 "It is the intention of Imperial Headquarters  
11 to capture the major points in the southern regions  
12 and at the same time to dispose of the China Incident,  
13 in the meantime making utmost efforts to prevent the  
14 outbreak of war against the Soviet Union. The Kwantung  
15 Army will perform its duties of defending Manchoukuo  
16 and the Kwantung Province, and in particular, it will  
17 make preparations for defensive operations against the  
18 Soviet Union, in order to meet any development of the  
19 situation. In settling any boundary dispute, efforts  
20 shall be made to localize the affair. In the case of  
21 special areas, defense by armed forces may be dispensed  
22 with, if the situation so demanded.

23 "(2) I was informed by the Chief of the Army  
24 General Staff that at the Liaison Conference toward the  
25 end of November 1941, it was agreed that although at

TANAKA, \*

DIRECT

1 the outset of an outbreak of war between Japan on the  
2 one hand and the United States and Britian on the other,  
3 it was hardly probable that Russia should take positive  
4 action against Japan, it was quite possible that the  
5 United States would utilize Russian territory in the  
6 Far East for military bases, and that Soviet Russia  
7 would act in various ways against Japan; but that ac-  
8 cording to later developments it was also possible that  
9 Soviet Russia would wage war against Japan. Neverthe-  
10 less, concrete measures towards these eventualities were  
11 not decided upon, excepting the existence of the follow-  
12 ing defensive plan against Soviet Russia.

13 "(3) The Chief of the Army General Staff de-  
14 cided that the operational plan in 1942 against Soviet  
15 Russia should be drafted along the line of the principle  
16 of the previous year's plan, and that it should generally  
17 be based upon the following policy: That the Kwantung  
18 Army should maintain its disposition up to that time  
19 but should assume strict precautionary measures,  
20 strengthen defenses and strive its utmost to prevent  
21 outbreak of a war. In case the United States and Soviet  
22 Russia in concert should challenge Japan from the north,  
23 or the Russian Army should independently challenge us,  
24 without delay Japan should transfer necessary divisions  
25 from Japan proper and China in order to destroy



TANAKA, S

DIRECT

1 Russian air forces in the Russian Far Eastern terri-  
2 tories, especially in the Maritime Province of Siberia.  
3 Thus our objective was not to fulfil the minimum de-  
4 fensive requirements by assuming a passive offensive in  
5 place of a protracted defensive operation.

6 "The above plan was decided upon the basis of  
7 a separate operations plan against Soviet Russia which  
8 had been studied since the end of July 1941, and the  
9 matters in it relating to the War Ministry were de-  
10 cided upon after consultation with that Ministry.

11 "(4) According to intelligence obtained by  
12 the Second Department, the Russian strength in the Far  
13 East at the beginning of 1942 was as follows:

14 "Total strength: 19 sharpshooter divisions

15 1 tank division

16 3 cavalry divisions

17 "Total... 23 divisions

18 "Ground forces south of Habarovsk

19 10 sharpshooter divisions

20 1 tank division

21 1 cavalry division

22 "Total... 12 divisions

23 "Air Forces:

24 60 heavy bombers

25 80 long range bombers

TANAKA, S

DIRECT

330 light bombers

450 fighters

60 assault planes

200 seaplanes

"Total... 1200

"The Kwantung Army around that time consisted of 13 divisions and about 500 airplanes, of which about 200 were operational (50 heavy bombers, 100 light bombers, 130 fighters), and in comparative ratio of the two ground forces ours were below 60% of the Russian forces.

"(5) The decision of the Liaison Conference about the middle of March 1942 was as follows:

"To conduct necessary operations against vital spots outside the occupied area in order to hasten the termination of the war by way of forcing the United States and Britain into a position of passive defense; to strive for the prompt settlement of the China Incident so far as circumstances permitted, taking advantage of the result of operations in southern regions, and to prevent as much as possible the occurrence of a new incident with Soviet Russia and to strengthen precautionary measures against the eventuality of war with Soviet Russia.

"(6) According to the estimate of the staff

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DIRECT

1 of the Kwantung Army, the Russian strength in the Far  
2 East consisted of 20 sharpshooter divisions, or 23  
3 divisions, including other divisions, 1300 tanks and  
4 1200 airplanes. Though the lowering in the standard  
5 of their fighting strength was perceptible, the entire  
6 fighting personnel totalled over 800,000. Against  
7 this the strength of the Kwantung Army was composed  
8 of 14 divisions, about 300,000 men, and about 600 air-  
9 planes. Thus the strength of the Kwantung Army was  
10 about 60% of the Russian forces then in the Far East.  
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TANAKA

DIRECT

1                   "(7) Beginning in May 1942, Imperial Head-  
2                   quarters were examining operations against the  
3                   Aleutian Islands, Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia, Eas-  
4                   tern New Guinea, etc., as operations against the  
5                   outer strategic points in the Pacific area. How-  
6                   ever, the operations which were actually carried out  
7                   were those of the Aleutian Islands, Midway, Eastern  
8                   New Guinea, etc. After the spring of 1942, Imper-  
9                   ial Headquarters were conducting various studies  
10                  with the intention of conducting a future offensive  
11                  with the occupation of Chungking as its objective.  
12                  This series of such operational plans by the Im-  
13                  perial Headquarters in 1942 is a fact indicative of  
14                  Japan's attitude of peace toward Soviet Russia.

15                "As to the offensive into the inland of  
16                China, aiming at the reduction of Chungking, a def-  
17                inite plan was formed through the study of the Army  
18                General Staff, and it was agreed that whether it  
19                should be put into execution was to be settled  
20                finally in the autumn of 1942. The nucleus of the  
21                strength necessary for this operation was to be 15  
22                divisions. Of the necessary strength and equipment,  
23                2 divisions, 200 airplanes, two-thirds of the motor  
24                vehicles and communications units, and almost all the  
25                river-crossing materiel were to be taken from those

TANAKA

DIRECT

1 in Manchuria, and the greater part of the necessary  
2 fuel and ammunition were to be taken and transferred  
3 from the Kwantung Army. In accordance with this  
4 plan the personnel to be transferred from Manchuria  
5 totalled 200,000. This plan, however, was abandon-  
6 ed in December 1942, as a result of adverse developp  
7 ments of the operations centering around Guadalcanal.

8 "(8) Our strength was transferred to the  
9 south-east sector of the Pacific from various  
10 quarters, including Manchuria, to cope with the  
11 counter-attack by the United States forces center-  
12 ing around the Solomon Islands and Guadalcanal after  
13 August 1942. This concentration of our forces made  
14 it all the more urgent to prevent the outbreak of  
15 any incident against Soviet Russia, so that ab-  
16 solute peace might be maintained between the two  
17 countries.

18 "(9) According to intelligence obtained  
19 from the Second Department at the end of 1942, the  
20 strength of the Kwantung Army consisted of 14  
21 divisions and 500 airplanes as against the Far  
22 Eastern Russian Army's 20 divisions and 1,000 air-  
23 planes. Our strength was calculated to be 70 per  
24 cent of theirs. Thus the Russian Army in the Far  
25 East continued to maintain a strength superior to



TANAKA

DIRECT

the Kwantung Army even in this period.

"(10) As to the operational plans against the outer strategic points in the Pacific area and the reduction of Chungking, the Army General Staff was worried since they might endanger the execution even of the passive defensive operations of the Kwantung Army against Soviet Russia, in reference to the military strength, especially airplanes, tanks, motor vehicles, various corps in the rear, and munitions, especially liquid fuel."

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half past nine on Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Monday, 2 June 1947, at 0930.)

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